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PUBLISH AT YOUR OWN RISK OR DON’T PUBLISH
AT ALL: FORUM SHOPPING TRENDS IN LIBEL
LITIGATION LEAVE THE FIRST AMENDMENT UNGUARANTEED
Heather Maly*
INTRODUCTION
Dr. Rachel Ehrenfeld’s British publisher declined to publish
her new book, Funding Evil: How Terrorism is Financed and How
to Stop It, after a wealthy Saudi, whose name appears in the book,
threatened to sue the publisher for defamation.1 Nevertheless, Dr.
Ehrenfeld was sued in a British court after twenty-three copies of
her book were sold through online retailers to individuals in the
United Kingdom (UK), and after the first chapter was posted on
the ABC News website.2 Dr. Ehrenfeld’s book traces the money
underwriting terrorist organizations, and it alleged that Khalid
Salim A Bin Mahfouz, a Saudi banker, funds terrorist activity. Mr.
Mahfouz’s lawsuit claimed that statements in the book linking him
to Al Qaeda and other entities defamed him in England, where he

* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2007; B.A. Georgetown University,
2001. The author would like to thank her family and friends for their love,
encouragement, patience and support. Special thanks extended to Professors
Neil Cohen and Richard Winfield for their guidance during the writing process.
She would also like to thank the staff of the Journal of Law and Policy for their
assistance and insight.
1
Sarah Lyall, Are Saudis Using British Libel Laws to Deter Critics?, NY
TIMES, May 22, 2004, at B1.
2
Mahfouz v. Ehrenfeld, [2005] EWHC (Q.B.D.) 1156 (Eng). The total
number of unique visitors to the ABCnews.com website during the month was
approximately 211,000, so the court inferred that a significant portion of those
visitors would have accessed the relevant pages. Id.
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conducts business and owns homes.3 Dr. Ehrenfeld decided not to
challenge the suit, and Mr. Mahfouz won a default judgment
against her.4 Dr. Ehrenfeld then sought a declaratory judgment
from the Southern District of New York to prevent enforcement of
the decision in the United States (US) as a violation of her rights
under the First Amendment.5
Dr. Ehrenfeld was not the first author to connect Mr. Mahfouz
to terrorist organizations and thereafter face a defamation action in
the UK.6 Mr. Mahfouz claims to have successfully sued or settled
with over thirty other publications that have alleged that he has
links to terrorism.7 Many of those actions have been successful
simply because the defendants settled with Mr. Mahfouz, due to
the high cost of libel litigation.8 Further, it is Mr. Mahfouz himself
who faces lawsuits, in the US, for his alleged financial
involvement and thus support of recent terrorist attacks.9
Dr. Ehrenfeld’s case is not unique. Throughout the world, and
often in the UK, journalists must defend themselves against libel
laws stricter than those in their own country.10 American
journalists relying on the protections of the First Amendment are
finding that foreign courts willingly assert jurisdiction over them if
the material they publish is viewed in those countries.11
3

Id.
Id.
5
Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, 04-CV-09641, 2005 WL 696769 (S.D.N.Y Mar.
23, 2005).
6
Lyall, supra note 1 (citing a lawsuit that Mahfouz won against The Mail
on Sunday for similar accusations); Jeffrey Toobin, Let’s Go: Libel, THE NEW
YORKER, Aug. 8, 2005 (describing Mahfouz’s website citing libel victories).
7
Thomas Lipscomb, Another First Amendment Landmark Case?, EDITOR
& PUBLISHER, Mar. 21, 2005, available at http://www.public-integrity.org/
publications/publications85.htm.
8
Id. For example, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post and The
New York Times have all settled actions with Mr. Mahfouz. Id. Further, his
website lists several recent suits, the court decisions, and often formal apologies
from the publishers. Bin Mahfouz Information, www.binmahfouz.info (last
visited Jan. 25, 2005).
9
Lipscomb, supra note 7.
10
David Kohler, Forty Years After New York Times v. Sullivan: The
Good, The Bad, and the Ugly, 83 OR. L. REV. 1203, 1204-05 (2004).
11
See Mahfouz v. Ehrenfeld, [2005] EWHC (Q.B.D.) 1156 (Eng.)
(inferring that since a number of people in the UK viewed the ABC news
4
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Disseminating information over the Internet provides courts with
justification for extending their jurisdiction beyond traditional
geographic boundaries.12 The actions of unrelated third parties—
readers of articles online, online book purchasers—substantiate
jurisdiction in foreign defamation disputes.13 For publishers, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to anticipate all of the laws they may be
subject to under such unlimited jurisdiction.14 American courts
have previously protected authors and publishers by refusing to
enforce foreign judgments that cannot be reconciled with the US
Constitution.15 However, such relief is not available when the
foreign defendant has assets in the jurisdiction where the action is
pursued since this creates jurisdiction over the American defendant
by the foreign state.16
The Internet is a new medium that simply highlights recurring
issues in international libel litigation.17 In defamation actions
pursued abroad, the problem often lies in the conflict between the
foreign jurisdiction’s substantive laws and the laws of the
defendant’s home country. In the US, the First Amendment
protects speech to promote an open exchange of ideals. In contrast,
many foreign nations acknowledge the importance of expression,
but are equally protective of an individual’s interest in his or her
reputation.18 This Note examines the differences between libel
laws of the US and the UK, as an example of the liability
American media companies can face under foreign laws.
website, a significant number of those people would have accessed the alleged
defamatory material); Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick [2002] 210 C.L.R. 575, 607
(Austl.) (substantiating jurisdiction based on subscription access to the
publication’s website).
12
Brian P. Werley, Aussie Rules: Universal Jurisdiction Over Internet
Defamation, 18 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 199, 200 (2004).
13
See Mahfouz v. Ehrenfeld, [2005] EWHC (Q.B.D.) 1156 (Eng.)
(substantiating jurisdiction because the book was available and purchased
through online retailers); Dow Jones & Co., 210 C.L.R. at 607 (substantiating
jurisdiction based on subscription access to the publication’s website).
14
Werley, supra note 12, at 231.
15
See, e.g., Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications, 585 N.Y.S.2d 661
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992); Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230 (Md. 1997).
16
Werley, supra note 12, at 229.
17
Dow Jones, 210 C.L.R. at 605.
18
See discussion infra Part I.
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Part I of this Note examines US and British libel law
jurisprudence, and contrasts the two models through a discussion
of a UK case involving an American media company. Part II
compares jurisdictional controversies within the US with the
decisions of foreign courts to exercise jurisdiction over American
defendants. Part III returns to Dr. Ehrenfeld’s case and considers
its potential for success based on past attempts to enforce foreign
libel judgments in the US. Part IV analyzes the chilling effect that
foreign libel laws could have on members of the American media
if the trend of libel judgments in foreign courts continues or
intensifies. This section also examines potential solutions to the
conflicts in defamation law and proposes that the most feasible
means of resolving the conflict lies within the status quo.
I. LIBEL LAWS
Throughout the world, freedom of expression is regarded as
essential to democracy, but in practice this can mean different
things in different places. In the US, speech is accorded the highest
value and injury to one’s reputation is sometimes an unfortunate
consequence of maintaining this freedom.19 Elsewhere, the value
placed on free expression may not override a person’s interest in
protecting their reputation. In some countries, defamation laws
allow the courts to impose criminal sanctions on the defendant,
thus creating a potential chill on the media.20 Australia and Canada
have both broadened the scope of their protection of free
expression in matters of political concern, but explicitly refuse to
expand the rule to mirror the protection of speech afforded in the
US.21
19

See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 281 (1964).
John Di Bari, A Survey of the Internet Jurisdiction Universe, 18 N.Y.
INT’L. L. REV. 123, 157-60 (2005) (citing examples of criminal sanctions
imposed for defamation in Germany, Italy and Zimbabwe). See also Rachel L.
Swarns, Government and Media Spar in Zimbabwe, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2002,
at A3; Despite Court Order, Zimbabwe Deports American Journalist, N.Y.
TIMES, May 17, 2003, at A5.
21
See generally Lange v. Australian Broadcasting Corp. [1997] 189 C.L.R.
520 (Austl.) (supporting a qualified privilege pertaining to information on
politics or government, as long as reporting is reasonable and not done with
20
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While each European country operates under its own laws, the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is influential in
the interpretation and development of these laws. The ECHR was
drawn up by Western European nations in response to the
perceived threat that communism in Eastern Europe could become
to human rights, and this treaty created the European Court of
Human Rights to ensure observance of the articles of the
Convention.22 The ECHR advocates the right to freedom of
expression as one of the essential foundations of a democratic
society, but allows exceptions to this freedom, including for the
protection of reputation.23 The exceptions must be balanced against
malice); Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 (Can.)
(specifically refusing to adopt the New York Times standards of US law). See
also Leonard Leigh, Of Free Speech and Individual Reputation: New York
Times v. Sullivan in Canada and Australia, in IMPORTING THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 49 (Ian Loveland ed., 1998); Kyo Ho Youm, Impact of Freedom
of the Press Abroad, 22 Fall COMM. LAW. 12 (overview of countries that have
expanded their law regarding freedom of expression).
22
GEOFFREY ROBERTSON & ANDREW NICOL, MEDIA LAW, 35 (4th ed.
2002). The ECHR set forth a catalogue of civil and political rights and freedoms
and eventually established the European Court of Human Rights as a mechanism
of enforcement of the obligations of the signatory states. All judgments are only
binding on the Member States concerned. See European Court of Human Rights,
Historical Background and Judgments, http://www.echr.coe.int (last visited Mar.
5, 2006). The UK was the first signatory in 1953, and the ECHR has since been
ratified by all 41 Member States of the Council of Europe. It did not become law
in the UK until its provisions were adopted by Parliament, which was done
through the Human Rights Act of 1998, which came into force in October of
2000.
23
Article 10 of the European Council on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms provides:
1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information
and ideas without interference by public authorities and regardless of
frontiers . . .
2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions,
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security, territorial
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for
the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation
or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information

MALY MACROED CORRECTED 7-30-06.DOC

888

7/30/2006 12:36 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

the freedom of expression, but this balancing test is by no means
equally weighted, in that the exceptions are interpreted strictly and
narrowly.24 For example, restrictions that require journalists to
prove the truth of the allegedly defamatory statements will often be
held unnecessarily prohibitive of speech.25 European Court of
Human Rights decisions are only binding on the signatory
countries involved in a particular case, but the decisions influence
the laws in the signatory countries to the ECHR, including the UK.
British Judges do pay heed to the freedom of expression principle
as defined by the ECHR and interpreted by the Court.26
British and American jurisprudence values the freedom of
expression, but the two countries differ as to how essential the
freedom of speech is in relation to other interests, such as
reputation, in order to protect the freedom of expression. American
received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality
of the judiciary.
Id. (emphasis added).
24
ROBERTSON & NICOL, supra note 22, at 38. The state bears the burden of
proving that the restriction at issue is necessary in a democratic society and that
there is a pressing social need for the restriction. Id.
25
Lingens v. Austria, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. 407, 419 (1986). Plaintiff was the
publisher of an Austrian magazine that printed two articles accusing the
Chancellor of protecting former members of the Nazi party for political reasons.
Plaintiff was required to prove the truth to escape conviction under Austrian
law, and was ultimately convicted of criminal defamation. He brought this
action for a violation of his rights under Article 10. Id. at 408-16. The court held
that the requirement that Lingens prove the truth of the allegations was
impossible and infringed the freedom of opinion, which is a fundamental right
under Article 10. Id. at 420-21. Though this case specifically deals with
statements of opinion, it does indicate the importance placed on the freedom of
expression, specifically when weighed against protection of reputation. Further,
the case focused on political speech, which receives more protection than
individual reputation. See also Oberschlick v. Austria, 19 EHRR 389 (1991).
Oberschlick was an Austrian journalist who claimed that some of the statements
made in a speech by politician and candidate Walter Grabher-Meyer resembled
the beliefs of the NSDAP (the equivalent of the Nazi party). He attempted to
have Grabher-Meyer prosecuted, and after this was unsuccessful, published the
full criminal information. Grabher-Meyer successfully brought a defamation
suit, and Oberschlick appealed to the European Court of Human Rights. In
overturning his conviction, the court held that freedom of political debate is the
core of the concept of a democratic society.
26
ROBERTSON & NICOL, supra note 22, at xii.
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courts uphold the First Amendment and focus on the value of free
expression in society.27 In consequence, the libel jurisprudence
protects speech more so than individual reputations.28 British law
has been slow to extend the freedom of expression to matters
beyond political speech, and remains highly protective of
individual reputation.29 The British libel law imposes much more
stringent requirements on media defendants than comparable US
law, and many identical cases would likely be decided differently
in each country.30 The differences between British and American
law are significant in application and contribute directly to the
uncertainty in the American media about which defamation laws
control and where they might be brought to defend suit.31
A. United States Libel Laws and the First Amendment
The First Amendment garners a near sacred place in American
society.32 It “forbids Congress from making any law which
abridges the freedom of speech.”33 This constitutional safeguard
“was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people.”34 Free speech is respected as a necessity to democratic
self-government and is prized for its protection of the free
exchange of ideas.35 As a result of the First Amendment’s role in
society, speech and interests of open dialogue are accorded more

27

See infra Part I.A.1.
See infra Part I.A.2.
29
See infra Part I.B.1.
30
David Hooper, Sullivan v. Reynolds: How Does the Actual Malice
Principle in Sullivan Compare with the Responsible Journalism Test in
Reynolds?, 2005 Issue No. 3 MEDIA L. RESOURCE CENTER BULL. 103, 103
(2005).
31
See infra Part I.B.2.
32
Stephen Sedley, The First Amendment: A Case for Import Controls?, in
IMPORTING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 23, 23 (Ian Loveland ed., 1998).
33
U.S. CONST. Amend. I
34
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
35
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927).
28
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weight than injury to reputation.36 Consequently, allegedly
defamatory speech involving public officials, public figures and
matters of public concern are protected by a high burden of proof
to establish libel.37
1. Philosophy Behind the First Amendment
The First Amendment was adopted with no debate, and many
of the Framers themselves were unsure what it would mean in
practice.38 Through scholarship and jurisprudence, various theories
have been enunciated and defended. Justice Hugo Black, for
example, proposed the idea that the First Amendment is absolute
and prohibits any restraint on speech.39 Alexander Meiklejohn
promoted the notion that free speech is a necessity for selfgovernment.40 Justice Holmes defined the search for truth, or
marketplace of ideas theory.41 Other theories contend that free
speech promotes self-fulfillment and autonomy,42 or that it serves
as a safety valve maintaining a balance between stability and
change.43 There is no generally accepted view on what free speech
is and what it protects, and in many ways First Amendment
jurisprudence could be the result of the political and social climate
at the time an issue comes before the court.44 For this reason, it is
36

See generally New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Curtis
Publ’g v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,
475 U.S. 767 (1986).
37
Id.
38
GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM
THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 42 (2004).
39
Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 864, 874 (1960).
40
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT 24-27 (1948).
41
Abrahams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes,
dissenting).
42
David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral
Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62 (1974).
43
THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 11-15 (1966).
44
STONE supra note 38, at 4-5 (suggesting that the only time the
government has sought to punish speech and criticism is when the country is
involved in war).
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necessary to look at the two primary theories—specifically the
democratic self-government notion and the marketplace of ideas
theory—to understand its current role.
One theory of the First Amendment contends that it is a
necessary element of self-government: For people to govern
themselves they must be free to pass their own judgment.45
Philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn felt this principle could be
deduced “from the basic American agreement that public issues
shall be decided by universal suffrage.”46 In his concurring opinion
in Whitney v. California, Justice Brandeis set forth the history of
the First Amendment and its intended value for self-government.
Those who won our independence believed that the final
end of the state was to make men free to develop their
facilities, and that in its government the deliberative forces
should prevail over the arbitrary . . . . They believed that
freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are
means indispensable to the discovery and spread of
political truth . . . . Believing in the power of reason as
applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence
coerced by law—the argument of force in its worst form.
Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing
majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free
speech and assembly should be guaranteed.47
Justice Brandeis’ democratic self-government paradigm
suggests that speech is not the end goal but rather a means to a
free-society. This view is concerned with the protection of those
more personal actions, such as thought and communication, that
allow individuals to participate in the public act of governing.48
This freedom extends beyond politics to all means by which
individuals obtain knowledge, including education and public
discussion of issues.49 Further, within the democratic selfgovernment theory of the First Amendment, there is also the theory
45

MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 40, at 26.
Id.
47
274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927).
48
Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP.
CT. REV. 245, 255 (1961).
49
Id. at 256-57.
46
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that identifies self-government, not through individual decision
making as Meiklejohn suggests, but in the process in which
citizens identify the government as their own.50 Official limitations
on public discourse would imply the democratic illegitimacy of the
state because any such results would only be achieved by limiting
the citizens’ ability to participate in the democratic process.51
On the other hand, freedom of expression can also be seen as
an end in itself. In his marketplace-of-ideas theory, Justice Holmes
suggests that more benefit is gained by society through free
expression.52 He stated that the “best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market.”53 Judge Learned Hand expressed a similar sentiment
about the First Amendment: “It presupposes that right conclusions
are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than
through any kind of authoritative selection.”54 The more people air
competing opinions and explain the values of their views, the more
likely people in society will understand the options and make the
best choices in all contexts. Free speech is justified based on the
overall benefits to society, and not due to the particular benefits
that the individual speaker may receive.55 These views require
tolerance of all speech, and Justice Holmes required a showing of
“clear and present danger” to stifle speech.56 This model does
endorse a function conducive to self-government because the
marketplace of ideas allows people to make informed voting
choices based on a plethora of all relevant information. But, it
suggests that free speech exists for the primary purpose of truth

50

Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2353, 2367-68 (2000).
51
Id.
52
Abrahams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes,
dissenting).
53
Id. See also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (Holmes,
dissenting).
54
United Statea v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
55
Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984
DUKE L.J. 1, 4-5 (1984).
56
Abrahams, 250 U.S. at 630-31.
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and not good government.57
2. Libel Law Jurisprudence
These competing theories of the First Amendment affect its
interpretation and application in the courts. Though the language of
the First Amendment could imply otherwise, the rights protected
are by no means absolute.58 The tort of defamation imposes
restrictions on what can be spoken and printed.59 The Supreme
Court has alternated between the paradigms of self-government
and “the marketplace of ideas” in its decisions, depending on the
interest to be protected.60 New York Times v. Sullivan,61 and its
progeny, established the Constitutional standard to be applied in
libel and defamation cases.
In New York Times, the Respondent Sullivan was an elected
official who supervised the police department in Montgomery
County, Alabama. He claimed that an advertisement printed in The
New York Times contained defamatory statements pertaining to
police activity against students during civil rights demonstrations.62
Though he was not named specifically in the ad, the reference to
the police, he argued, implicated him as the Commissioner of
Public Affairs.63 It was not disputed that some of the statements in
the ad were not accurate depictions of the events described.64
57

Ronald J. Krotosyzynski, Jr., The Chrysanthemum, The Sword and the
First Amendment: Disentangling Culture, Community and Freedom of
Expression, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 905, 919 (1998).
58
Koningsberg v. California, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961).
59
50 AM. JUR. 2d Libel and Slander § 118. Defamation is a false
publication that causes injury to a person’s reputation, or exposing him to
contempt, public hatred, ridicule, shame or disgrace, or which affects him
adversely in his trade or business. Id. at § 6. “Libel consists of the publication
of defamatory matter by written or printed words, by its embodiment in physical
form or by any other form of communication that has the potentially harmful
qualities characteristic of written or printed words.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 568 (1977).
60
Krotosyzynski, supra note 57, at 923.
61
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
62
Id. at 256.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 258.
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The Court in New York Times was more concerned with the
nature of the speech sought to be protected, rather than which
litigant should prevail.65 As the Court suggested, this approach
recognizes the value of speech in the larger public context.66 First,
the decision brought libel under the standards of the First
Amendment, proclaiming, “libel can claim no talismanic immunity
from constitutional limitations.”67 After discussing the importance
of freedom of speech, the court concluded that injury to the
reputation of public officials is not a sufficient justification for
silencing speech.68 The potential harm from silencing speech is not
saved by an “exception for a test of truth.”69 To safeguard against
self-censorship by the media and constraints on public discourse
about public officials, the Court held that to recover for libel a
plaintiff must prove that a “statement was made with ‘actual
malice’that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard for whether it was false or not.”70
This presents a difficult barrier for plaintiffs to overcome in
bringing defamation actions. The court balanced the constitutional
implications of the different forms of speech—specifically if and
what kind of defamatory speech is considered protected speech
under the First Amendment—rather than balancing the interests of
the individual parties.71 This distinction reflects the importance
placed on public dialogue, as a free society should be able to
contemplate matters of public concern, including the conduct of
public officials.72 Public officials who feel they have been wronged
by erroneous speech are encouraged to respond with speech, rather
than to seek repression of the allegedly erroneous speech or to seek
damages.73
65

Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak From Times to Time: First
Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REV.
935, 942 (1968).
66
New York Times, 376 U.S. at 269.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 273.
69
Id. at 271.
70
Id. at 279-80.
71
Nimmer, supra note 65, at 942.
72
Id. at 950.
73
Id.
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New York Times was a narrow decision limited to a libel action
pursued by a public official, and the Court made no attempt to
determine who would qualify as a public official.74 The plaintiff
was an elected official, and this was sufficient.75 Speech served by
the First Amendment, however, is not limited to the subject of
public officers. In Curtis Publishing v. Butts and Association Press
v. Walker,76 the New York Times rule was expanded to cover public
figures who were not government officials. The scope of
constitutionality for speech on public figures was determined not
by newsworthiness but by an analogy to public officials.77 In
Curtis Publishing, the Court held that the Founders did not intend
to limit freedom of discussion to discussion of government,
because a free press promotes truth in general.78 Individuals who
garner a certain amount of public interest could be labeled public
figures, and they tend to have access to the media to rebut
defamatory accusations.79 This analysis focuses on the ability to
respond to accusations and the assumption of risk in the public role
rather than principles of promoting individual participation in selfgovernment. As discussed in New York Times, some plaintiffs will
be unable to overcome the barriers of this standard, but it avoids
the evil of self-censorship that could occur when a when a speaker
must prove the truth of a statement to succeed in his or her
defense.80 Rather than allow separate state libel laws for public
figures, the Supreme Court enacted a more rigorous federal
standard.81
74

New York Times, 376 U.S. at 284.
In a later case, the Court described public officials as “those among the
hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have,
substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of government affairs.”
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
76
388 U.S. 130 (1967). (Plurality opinion) (cases decided together).
77
Harry Kalvern, Jr., The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill,
Butts, and Walker, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 267, 287 (1967).
78
Curtis Publ’g, 388 U.S. at 147.
79
Id. at 154-55.
80
376 U.S. at 279. See Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 340-41 (1974).
81
Curtis Publ’g, 388 U.S. at 155. Since this was a plurality opinion, there
was not an agreed upon standard to judge libel actions for public figures. The
Court did agree that public figures should be treated like public officials. Id. at
162.
75
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In actions involving private figures, the justifications used in
New York Times and Curtis Publishing are not as readily
applicable. Private figures do not thrust themselves into the
spotlight as do public officials or figures, and private figures do not
have effective opportunities for rebuttal available to them.82 The
need to protect an individual’s reputation becomes more crucial in
these situations in which unwanted public exposure leaves
individuals more vulnerable to injury.83 In Gertz v. Welch, the
Court declined to apply the New York Times standard to private
figures, and deferred to state law, as states had an interest in
compensating private individuals for injury to reputation.84 Gertz
does require that a plaintiff show fault to recover damages.85
In Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps,86 the Court also
recognized a heightened protection of speech as to matters of
public concern involving private figures, though it affirmed that
this standard is less forbidding than when the plaintiff is a public
figure involved in a matter of public concern.87 In these instances,
since the public could benefit from the dissemination of
information, the balance favors protecting speech.88 The Court held
that “where a newspaper publishes speech of public concern, the
Plaintiff cannot recover damages without also showing that the
82

Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-45. The Petitioner was a reputable attorney who
agreed to represent a Chicago police officer accused of murder. An article in
Respondent’s paper called him a ‘Communist-fronter,’ claimed he had a
criminal record and also accused him of arranging a ‘frame-up’ of his client. Id.
at 325-26. Petitioner Gertz was not a public figure in that he had achieved no
general fame and he “did not thrust himself into the vortex of the public issue.”
Id. at 351-52.
83
Id. at 345.
84
Id. at 345-47.
85
Id. at 347. The Court also recognized the danger of self-censorship
resulting from punitive damages. As a result, a private defamation plaintiff who
wants to recover punitive damages must meet the high actual malice standards
of New York Times; otherwise, the individual will be limited in recovery to
actual damage sustained. Id. at 350.
86
475 U.S. 767 (1986). Hepps was the principle stockholder of a
corporation that franchised a chain of convenience stores. A series of articles
was published linking him and the corporation to organized crime. He then
brought the defamation suit. Id. at 768-70.
87
Id. at 776.
88
Id. at 776-77.
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statements at issue are also false.”89 The plaintiff must show fault
on the part of the publisher regarding the adequacy of the
investigation to recover damages, and to an extent this will include
evidence of the falsity of the allegations.90 This standard imposes
less of a burden on plaintiffs than the requirement of showing
“actual malice” or “knowledge of falsity” as in the New York
Times standards. It does not have the same deterrent effect on the
media, because the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the falsity of
the allegedly defamatory statement.91 The Court decided that the
balance should favor protecting true speech.92 Some false speech
may be allowed to stand because the plaintiff cannot meet the
burden, but the Court judged that this is preferable to have true
speech deterred.93 Placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff,
rather than the publisher, makes it much less likely that speech of
public concern will be deterred.94
These cases overwhelmingly favor the interests of speech over
reputation. In summary, in defamation actions, the court considers
both the plaintiff’s role in society and the nature of the information
at issue. Starting with New York Times, public figures bringing
defamation actions must show that the alleged defamatory
statement was made with actual malice—that is, with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard for whether or not it was
false.95 This standard has been extended to public figures, but the
Court does not require as exacting a standard for speech involving
private figures.
The various US approaches favor speech, and in contrast, UK
law shows more deference to the presumed injury to individual
reputation. The balance between the freedom of expression and
individual reputation shifts differently, such that free speech
interests are not perceived as being a sufficient justification to
protect potentially false speech.
89
90
91
92
93
94
95

Id. at 769.
Id. at 778.
Id. at 777.
Id. at 793.
Id. at 776.
Id. at 777.
New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
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B. United Kingdom Libel Laws

The freedom of expression does not have the same
constitutional origins or statutory protections in Great Britain that
it has in the US, but it does nonetheless constitute a respected
value in British law.96 No definitive statement exists in the
statutory law to define the scope of free speech; rather the freedom
exists where neither common law nor statute restricts it.97 The
courts acknowledge in their opinions the importance of protecting
the freedom of expression and its importance in the political
process.98 British judges, however, are not swayed by lengthy
arguments of the underlying political or moral philosophy behind
freedom of speech and expression, nor is it usual for them to
discuss these principles in their opinions.99 While freedom of
expression and the dissemination of information are important in
the context of libel, reputation is still accorded significant
importance, except in matters of political speech. There are limited
exceptions to the strict libel law standards for free speech
concerns.100
1. Libel Law Jurisprudence
The British defamation laws predominantly treat all plaintiffs
the same, regardless of whether they are public or private
figures.101 In libel cases in Great Britain, the court presumes that a

96

ERIC BARENDT ET AL., LIBEL AND THE MEDIA: THE CHILLING EFFECT 1

(1997).
97

Id. at 29. Article 10 of the ECHR was incorporated into British Law.
Though it does create a statutory right of freedom of expression, the limits are
not defined. ROBERTSON & NICOL, supra note 22.
98
Reynolds v. Times Newspapers [2001] 2.A.C. 127, 200 (U.K.). See, e.g.,
Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers, Ltd., [1993] A.C. 534
(refusing a common law right of government institutions to bring an action for
defamation damages as contrary to public policy for prohibiting speech).
99
Barendt, supra note 96, at 30. This stands in contrast to their American
counterparts whose speech related opinions often consist of thorough
discussions of the underlying principles.
100
Id. at 178.
101
Rodney A. Smolla, Law of Defamation §1.9 (2d. ed. 1999).
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contested statement is defamatory.102 The defendant typically has
the burden to prove the truth of the allegedly defamatory statement
to defeat the charges.103 This has changed little from common law
origins and remains a great challenge for the defendant.104 In 2002,
the British government adopted the Human Rights Act of 1998 that
guarantees a freedom of expression in accordance with Article 10
of the European Convention on Human Rights.105 This covenant
reflects the ideal that freedom of speech is itself an aim and a
cornerstone of democratic society.106 Though there is now a
statutory recognition of freedom of expression, the judiciary is still
extremely protective of individual reputations.107
In a defamation action, the plaintiff needs to show that the
work identified him or her, conveyed a defamatory meaning, and
was published by the defendant or in circumstances in which the
defendant controlled the publication.108 A statement is generally
understood as defamatory if it is calculated to injure the reputation
of an individual in the eyes of the reasonable members of the
public.109 This standard does allow some room for leeway
depending on the context of the statement. Whether a statement is
defamatory will be measured by its ordinary meaning or the
innuendo it coveys.110 The ordinary meaning prong is a factual
question based on how the words would be understood by ordinary
102

Id.
Id.
104
Id.
105
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, art. 10, 1, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 230
(modified Nov. 1, 1998).
106
ROBERTSON & NICOL, supra note 22 at x.
107
Id. Article 10(2) does allow signatory countries to limit the freedom of
expression to protect reputation. The European Court of Human Rights has
adopted a balancing approach when looking at the right to freedom of
expression compared with the exception for the enumerated protections,
including the protection of reputation. The permissible restriction must be
‘necessary in a democratic society’ to further the stated goals. This creates a
presumption of freedom of expression when balancing the competing interests.
BRANDT, supra note at 96.
108
SIR BRIAN NEILL & RICHARD RAMPTON, DUNCAN AND NEIL ON
DEFAMATION §5.01 (2nd ed. 1983).
109
BARENDT, supra note 96.
110
NEILL & RAMPTON, supra note 108, at § 4.02
103
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people using their general knowledge and common sense.111
Innuendos are interpreted in context and based on any relevant
extrinsic circumstances.112
Since the allegedly defamatory statements are presumed false
and actionable, the defendant must prove the truth of the
statements or establish another privilege to defeat the charges.113 In
addition to challenging any of the previously named elements of a
prima facie case,114 the defendant can either claim a justification or
a privilege. Under the justification defense, the defendant bears the
burden of proving the truth of the words in substance or in fact.115
This burden presents a difficult barrier for defendants to overcome
when faced with a libel suit.116 For example, David Irving, a
leading figure in the Holocaust denial, accused Deborah Lipstadt
of defaming him in her book Denying the Holocaust—The
Growing Assault on Truth and Memory. In defense, Lipstadt was
required to prove that the Holocaust happened to defeat the
claim.117 By the time she succeeded, she had run up a considerably
111

Id. at § 4.04
Id. at § 4.18
113
BARENDT, supra note 96, at 9.
114
The work identified him or her, conveyed a defamatory meaning, and
was published by the defendant or in circumstances in which the defendant
controlled the publication. Supra note 100.
115
NEILL & RAMPTON, supra note 108, at §§ 11.01 and 11.03. It should be
noted that the defendant’s state of mind in publishing the work is irrelevant.
116
The procedures and costs of proving the truth of a defense can be
significant. Media defendants may not be able to produce witnesses that they
relied on and promised confidentiality to. Claimants may plead in the most
exaggerated sense of the meaning of the alleged defamatory statement, and so
the media defendant must prove the truth in this meaning and other perceived
innuendo. The costs of the process can be significant. The discovery process and
ability to cross-examine the libel plaintiff, who almost always must take the
stand, do lessen the difficulties slightly. ROBERTSON & NICOL, supra note 22, at
114-17.
117
Irving v. Penguin Books, [2001] EWCA Civ 1197. Irving is a published
historian. In her book, Lipstadt identifies Irving as a denier of the Holocaust
who skews data to reach unreliable conclusions. In the course of the trial,
Lipstadt brought forth numerous expert witnesses discrediting his theories,
among them that gas chambers were an impossibility. The entire legal battle
lasted approximately five years. Deborah Lipstadt, Irving v. Penguin UK and
Deborah Lipstadt: Building a Defense Strategy, an Essay, 27 NOVA L. REV. 243
(Winter 2002). In an interesting follow-up, David Irving was arrested in Austria
112
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high legal bill.118
British law has exceptions that can save defendants from
overcoming the burden of proving the truth of the underlying
statement at issue. The courts do acknowledge that there may be
higher priorities in the wider public interest.119 The “fair comment”
exception may apply to opinions made by the author on a matter of
public interest.120 The statement must also be based on fact,
reasonably seen as an opinion that the author could express based
on those facts, and made without malice.121 The legal rules for this
defense can be very technical and juries still often look at whether
the truth of the underlying allegation has been proven.122
Another exception to the British libel laws is an absolute
privilege exception that mainly applies to comments made by
members of Parliament, but members of the press can claim this
defense for fair and accurate reporting on judicial proceedings.123
The libel laws further recognize a qualified privilege when
reporting on a government entity, reasoning that due to the public
interest, government bodies should be open to criticism and these
institutions should be unable to prohibit speech.124 The qualified
privilege exception assumes that a legal, moral or social duty exists
from the publisher communicating the information to the reader
receiving it.125 This privilege, however, is rather vague and the
on November 11, 2005 and charged with Holocaust denial. The charges
specifically stem from statements he made in two speeches in 1989 alleging that
the Nazi gas chambers did not exist. Richard Bernstein, Austria Refuses Bail to
Briton Accused of Denying Holocaust, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2005, at A3. He
has since pled guilty and been sentenced to three years in prison by an Austrian
court. AP, Austria Imposes 3-Year Sentence on Notorious Holocaust Denier,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006, at A.
118
Sarah Lyall, Where Suing for Libel is a National Specialty, NY TIMES,
July 22, 2000, at B9. Her legal costs are reported to exceed three million dollars.
119
Reynolds v. Times Newspapers [2001] 2.A.C. 127 (U.K.). (Nicholls)
120
NEILL & RAMPTON, supra note 108, at § 12.01.
121
Id. at § 12.02.
122
Russell L. Weaver et al, Defamation Law and Free Speech: Reynolds v.
Times Newspapers and the English Media, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1255,
1269 (2004).
123
Barendt et al., supra note 96 at 13.
124
Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers [1993] A.C. 534
(U.K.).
125
NEILL & RAMPTON, supra note 108, at § 14.01 and § 14.04.
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circumstances of each case determine its application.126
Reynolds v. Times Newspaper127 is the leading UK case on
qualified privilege, though it leaves the news media uncertain as to
how much protection and what type of protection it actually
provides upon subsequent interpretation.128 Regardless of this
uncertainty, the case represents an expansion of defamation law
beyond the previous narrow parameters.129 Plaintiff Albert
Reynolds, the former Irish Prime Minister, brought the suit for
defamation against the British mainland edition of a national
newspaper. The publication related to a political crisis in Ireland
resulting in the plaintiff’s resignation as prime minister.130 He
claimed that the words in the article injured his reputation by
implying that he deliberately and dishonestly misled the House of
Representatives and his cabinet colleagues.131 The trial jury
awarded Reynolds no damages, but the court refused to recognize
the defense of qualified privilege thus burdening the defendant
with the costs.132 Both parties appealed the decision, and the Court
of Appeals set the verdict aside due to jury misdirection and ruled
that the publication was not covered by the qualified privilege.133
The decision was appealed to the House of Lords to determine the
issue of qualified privilege.134
In Reynolds, the court refused to adopt a new qualified
privilege encompassing all political speech, as the defendants
proposed, because it would fail to provide adequate protection for
reputation.135 The court also thought it unsound to distinguish
between political matters and other matters of public concern.136
126

Id. at § 14.03.
[2001] 2.A.C. 127 (U.K.).
128
Weaver, supra note 122, at 1260-61.
129
Ian Cram, Reading Uncertainty in Libel Law After Reynolds v. Times
Newspapers? Jameel and the Unfolding Defense of Qualified Privilege, ENT. L.
R. 2004, 15(5), 147-150.
130
[2001] 2.A.C. 127, 191 (U.K.).
131
Id.
132
Id. at 192.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Reynolds, 2.A.C. at 204.
136
Id.
127
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The court decided that the qualified privilege should be available
upon the established test of whether there has been a duty to
publish the material to the intended recipients and whether they
had an interest in receiving it, taking into account all of the
circumstances of the publication.137
The leading opinion by Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead
acknowledges and praises the importance of the freedom of
expression.138 He sees the freedom to disseminate and receive
information as essential to the political process.139 In looking at
this right in light of the common law’s strict protection of
reputation, he considers the laws of other countries, including the
malice standard of New York Times, and declines to adopt this
standard due to the potential implications of such a decision.140
Ultimately, he sees the qualified privilege test as elastic and lists a
non-inclusive list of ten factors that should be weighed.141 These
137

Id. at 205. Though the court adopted a qualified privilege, it ultimately
dismissed the appeal. This was not a publication which was should in the public
interest be protected as privilege absent proof of malice. Id. at 206.
138
Id. at 200.
139
Id.
140
Id. at 198-201. “Malice is notoriously difficult to prove.” It would
encourage people to publish quickly absent sufficient proof in the interest of
getting the scoop. Id. at 201.
141
Id. at 204-05. The factors that he names are: 1. The seriousness of the
allegation. The more serious the charge, the more the public is misinformed and
the individual harmed, if the allegation is not true. 2. The nature of the
information, and the extent to which the subject matter is a matter of public
concern. 3. The source of the information. Some informants have no direct
knowledge of the events. Some have their own axes to grind, or are being paid
for their stories. 4. The steps taken to verify the information. 5. The status of the
information. The allegation may have already been the subject of an
investigation that commands respect. 6. The urgency of the matter. News is
often a perishable commodity. 7. Whether comment was sought from the
plaintiff. He may have information others do not possess or have not disclosed.
Approaching the plaintiff will not always be necessary. 8. Whether the article
contained the gist of the plaintiff’s side of the story. 9. The tone of the article. A
newspaper can raise queries or call for an investigation. It need not adopt
allegations as statements of fact. 10. The circumstances of the publication,
including the timing. Id. at 205.
Whether or not the matter is a qualified privilege is a matter for the judge. Lord
Nicholls feels that the uncertainty will be resolved over time as a body of case
law develops. Id.
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factors cover such concerns as the quality of the newsgathering,
the nature of the information and the importance of the
information.142 But, he concludes, with matters of public concern,
the court should give the freedom of expression particular
importance in this balance, and any doubts should be resolved in
favor of publication.143
The opinion suggests that in matters of public concern the press
will receive more protection against defamation actions in the
future since doubts should favor the press, but it does not
necessarily cause a considerable change in how the courts
approach freedom of expression issues.144 The judgment still
leaves wide latitude for courts to adopt their own interpretations of
the circumstances upon considering the nature of the information
or the tone of the piece, and thus members of the media may be
uncertain as to how the rule will be applied.145 Further, earlier in
the decision Reynolds affirms that considerable importance is still
placed on protecting reputation.146 In application, the criteria in
Reynolds are subject to rather high standards that may be difficult
to overcome.147 This privilege requires more than subject matter
that is of public interest.148
On its face, the opinion could arguably resemble the Gertz and
Philadelphia Newspapers decisions, in that it seems to offer more
142

Id.
Id. at 205.
144
Ian Loveland, A New Legal Landscape? Libel Law and Freedom of
Political Expression in the United Kingdom, EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 2000, 5,
476-92.
145
Weaver, supra note 122, at 1315.
146
Reynolds, 2.A.C. at 201.
147
See generally Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe [2004] E.M.L.R. 11,
209. The Wall Street Journal published an article describing a U.S. and Saudi
government investigation into terrorism funding. The Jameel Group was named
as a possible subject of the investigation. In looking at whether the subject
matter is of public interest or concern, the court considered the urgency of the
dissemination as relevant. While terrorism may be of general public interest,
there was no public interest in publishing the specific names of an ongoing
investigation in the United States at that point in time or without further
confirmation. Id. So, the qualified privilege defense was rejected. It has been
suggested that this case reads the qualified privilege too narrowly. See Cram,
supra note 129.
148
McCartan Turkington Breen v. Times Newspapers [2001] 2 A.C. 277.
143
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protection to the press in publications on matters of public concern
that it previously did. In practice, certain journalistic decisions
could ruin the defense149 or matters of public concern could be
interpreted too narrowly.150 Further, public concern exceptions
could, in the extreme, be limited to political matters, as the court is
willing to show more tolerance in this arena.151 Ultimately, the
standard in Reynolds implies that the defense of qualified privilege
will be judged on whether the work at issue was published in line
with standards of responsible journalism and whether the subject
matter of the publication is of such a nature that it is in the public’s
interest for it to be published.152
2. An Example of the Plaintiff-Friendly Libel Laws Attracting
“Libel Tourists”
The United Kingdom has notoriously plaintiff-friendly laws for
defamation that attract “libel tourists” who try to take advantage of
the pro-plaintiff laws.153 For example, film director Roman
Polanski recently succeeded in a libel suit in the UK against
American magazine Vanity Fair, for defamatory statements
contained in the magazine.154 Polanski is a resident and citizen of
France, and a fugitive from justice in the United States.155 At trial
he had to testify via video because his fears of extradition
prevented him from entering the UK, his chosen venue.156 He won

149

Arguably, there is always something more that a journalist could have
done in investigating a story. A publisher’s success under Reynolds could
depend on the ability to convince a judge that it was the right editorial decision
to publish when it did. Meryl Evans, The Reynolds Privilege in Practice, 2003
Issue No. 3 MEDIA L. RESOURCE CENTER BULL. 23, 33 (2003).
150
See supra note 122.
151
Evans, supra note 149.
152
Jameel v. Wall Street [2005] H.R.L.R 10, 387.
153
Toobin, supra note 6.
154
Polanski v. Conde Nast Publications, UKHL 10 (2005).
155
Id. at ¶3, 7.
156
The reason that he could not appear in Great Britain was fear of
extradition to the United States where he plead guilty to the charge of unlawful
sexual intercourse with a minor after being indicted on 6 related charges.
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a verdict of £50,000.157 The lawsuit arose from an article in which
Vanity Fair recounted a story of the sexual advances Polanski
allegedly made toward a woman just after the death of his wife.158
It is generally agreed that the story is true, but that the date of the
incident was incorrectly reported.159 He further contests some
statements he allegedly made that appeared in the article and
portray him as insensitive in the wake of his wife’s murder.160
Polanski had no real ties to the UK, and Vanity Fair’s
circulation there was minimal compared with its larger American
audience.161 If Polanski’s predominant concern was vindicating his
reputation, the action would have more of an impact in the US
where the article was more widely read, or in France where
Polanski lived. But, since the UK is the “libel capital of the
Western world,” it provided the more plaintiff-friendly forum.162 In
the US, Polanski would be considered a public figure, and, thus,
subject to the more press protective principles first defined in New
York Times and extended in Curtis Publishing.163 Under British
law, the qualified privilege would not apply since this is not a
matter of public concern, and so Vanity Fair had to establish truth
to defeat the suit. This case demonstrates how the British libel laws
are used to circumvent the stricter American laws.
II. JURISDICTION
The Internet has created a world without jurisdictional
Graydon Carter, Roman Holiday, VANITY FAIR, Oct. 2005, at 80, 92, available
at http://www.vanityfair.com/commentary/content/articles/ 050919roco02.
157
Id.
158
Polanski, UKHL 10 at ¶ 3. Members of the Charles Manson cult
murdered Polanski’s wife Sharon Tate. The article claimed that he told the
woman he would “make another Sharon Tate out of [her]” Id.
159
Simon Freeman, Polanski’s £ 50,000 Libel Victory, TIMES ONLINE, July
22, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/printFriendly/0,,1-21704484-2,00.html.
160
Polanski, UKHL 10 at ¶5.
161
Polanski v. Conde Nast Publications UKHL 10 ¶12 (2005). The
circulation in England and Wales at the time was 53,000 compared to 1.13
million in the United States. Id.
162
Be Reasonable, TIMES ONLINE, May 19, 2005, http://www.
timesonline.co.uk/printFriendly/o,,1-41-1618105-41,00.html.
163
See supra Part I.A.2 for a complete discussion of these tests.
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boundaries and expanded the potential for forum shopping.164 An
article posted on the Internet can be viewed in any country with
telephone or cable access.165 This raises the question as to whether
a person or company that posts something online is risking suit in
any country in the world.166 It would be difficult, if not impossible,
to anticipate and comply with the laws of every country. No
international treaty or convention has been able to solve this
compliance problem.167 In the absence of a universally accepted
international standard, each court conducts its own analysis of
long-arm jurisdiction to determine whether its forum may resolve
cases involving international parties. As some defamation
decisions indicate, even the most minimal contact by a foreign
party with the forum country can justify jurisdiction.168
Two standards typically control a determination of jurisdiction
in defamation cases involving foreign parties: US courts follow an
established due process standard and focus on the contacts with the
forum state; many foreign courts, specifically the UK, look to
where the harm, or injury to one’s reputation, occurred.169 In
defamation cases, different interpretations as to when and where
publication occurs further influence courts’ reasoning regarding
jurisdiction. Considering the current differences in libel law
standards, the issue of jurisdiction can be determinative of a case’s
outcome. When a court cannot exert jurisdiction over a foreign
party, the party will be free from the duties imposed by the laws of
that country. The question of jurisdiction in the age of the Internet,
and in light of the unique circumstances that arise with the tort of
defamation, poses unique issues for courts. Absent a universal
standard, judges are cognizant of the reasoning of courts all over
the world in reaching decisions.

164

Bari, supra note 20, at 123.
Dr. Georgios I. Zekos, Personal Jurisdiction After Dow Jones & Co Inc
v. Gutnik, INTELL. PROP. & IT LAW 10.3(3), June 8, 2005 (UK).
166
Timofeeva, supra note 20, at 201.
167
Bari, supra note 20, at 166-67.
168
See generally Mahfouz v. Ehrenfeld [2005] EWHC (Q.B.D.) 1156, Dow
Jones, 210 C.L.R. at 594.
169
Bari, supra note 20, at 165.
165

MALY MACROED CORRECTED 7-30-06.DOC

908

7/30/2006 12:36 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
A. Jurisdictional Approaches in the United States

International Shoe v. Washington170 established the standard
for determining jurisdiction across state lines in the US, and while
the borderless nature of the Internet challenges the current notion
of jurisdiction, the International Shoe standards are still
substantially applicable.171 Under International Shoe, the
defendant must have established minimum contacts with the forum
state, and an assertion of jurisdiction must comport with due
process, measured by “traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.”172 This standard of due process is met when
defendants have purposefully availed themselves of privileges of
the forum state, such that they could reasonably anticipate being
subject to suit there.173 The success of International Shoe and its
170

326 U.S. 310 (1945). International Shoe was a Delaware corporation
engaged in the manufacture and sale of shoes. It did not maintain a place of
business in Washington, but it did employ between 12 and 13 salespeople who
resided in Washington. They were under direct supervision from the company,
their principle activities were confined to Washington and they received
commission based on their sales in Washington. The issue was whether the
Washington court had jurisdiction over International Shoe for its activities in the
state. Id. at 311-14. The Court held that the operations within the state
established sufficient contact with the state to make the forum reasonable and
just according to the “traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice”
to permit the state to enforce the obligations that the defendant has incurred
there. Id. at 320.
171
Dennis T. Yokoyama, You Can’t Always Use the Zippo Code: The
Fallacy of a Uniform Theory of Internet Personal Jurisdiction, 54 DEPAUL L.
REV.1147, 1162-63 (2005).
172
326 U.S. at 316. Here, I am distinguishing in personam jurisdiction, as
in International Shoe, from traditional notions of general jurisdiction such as
citizenship in the forum state, incorporation in the forum state, or service of
process on the individual in the forum state. See, e.g., Milliken v. Meyer, 311
U.S. 457, 462-63 (1940), Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
173
World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). Here,
defendants were automobile dealers in the New York area. An automobile that
the defendants sold was involved in an accident in Oklahoma. The Court said
that it was reasonable to anticipate that the car might be used in Oklahoma, but
that alone was not enough to assert jurisdiction over the defendants. They did
not direct activity outside of the tri-state area, and thus the plaintiff’s unilateral
activity was too attenuated for the federal court in Oklahoma’s exercise of
jurisdiction to meet due process requirements.
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progeny results from its flexibility and ability to evolve with
changing notions of commerce.174
The Internet creates a world unconstrained by traditional
geographical boundaries. As a result, notions of personal
jurisdiction in this borderless realm are difficult to reconcile with
the established standards. While the standards of International
Shoe cannot be seamlessly applied to Internet jurisdiction, a
leading case confronting Internet jurisdiction, Zippo
Manufacturing Company v. Zippo Dot Com,175 attempts to parallel
International Shoe.176 The manufacturer of Zippo lighters brought
suit in the Western District of Pennsylvania under the Lanham Act
for trademark and dilution claims against a computer news service
using the domain names zippo.com, zippo.net and zipponews.com.
The website operator is a California corporation with its principal
place of business in California. Its contacts with Pennsylvania
occurred exclusively over the Internet.177 In Zippo, the court
ultimately found that the Internet contacts with the state if
Pennsylvania were sufficient to substantiate jurisdiction.178 Zippo
created a sliding scale along which jurisdiction can be measured
based upon the level of interactivity between the defendant and the
forum state.179 This scale ranges from passive sites in which the
defendant merely posts information on the web to more active sites
in which the defendant clearly enters into contracts and conducts
business over the Internet.180 Interactive sites that purposefully
avail themselves of the jurisdiction’s laws are impliedly subject to
jurisdiction there as well.181 The sliding scale model lends doubt
and confusion due to the gray area in the middle of the spectrum,
but it represents the notion that a defendant must actively seek out
contact in the forum state to be subject to in personam jurisdiction

174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181

Yokoyama, supra note 171, at 1163.
952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
Yokoyama, supra note 171, at 1163.
952 F. Supp. at 1121.
Id at 1127.
Id. at 1124.
Id.
Id.

MALY MACROED CORRECTED 7-30-06.DOC

910

7/30/2006 12:36 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

in that state.182
Defamation is a non-physical tort without distinct geographical
parameters, and the process of publication—including
investigating, writing, printing, and disseminating—may occur in
several different jurisdictions.183 As a result, defamation cases do
not easily fold into the standard parameters established in
International Shoe, and the Supreme Court has considered the
uniqueness of the tort in its jurisdictional analysis.184 In Keeton v.
Hustler Magazines, the defendant publisher produced a nationwide
magazine such that the Court said, “[t]here is no unfairness in
calling it to answer for the contents of the publication wherever a
substantial number of copies are regularly sold and distributed.”185
The circulation in the forum state was sufficient to assert
jurisdiction, as the defendant purposefully directed content in the
forum state.186
The Supreme Court has also held that a plaintiff’s lack of
contact with the forum state does not necessarily limit imposition
of personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants.187 In Calder
v. Jones, the court built upon World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson,
and based its determination of jurisdiction on the effects that
conduct in Florida could have in California.188 In Calder, the
182

Yokoyama, supra note 171, at 1166. The gray area referred to could be
an interactive registration service to access sites but which involves no other
overt commerce. While the defendant may be aware that there is contact with a
forum state, there is not necessarily control or specific targeting to a forum state
in those situations. These can be distinguished from revenue-generating
transactions.
183
James R. Pielemeier, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law: The
Special Case of Multistate Defamation, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 381, 393 (1985).
184
See generally Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-89 (1984) (reasoning
that the petitioner intentionally aimed the actions in California and that the
injury would be felt in the state in which respondent lives and works). Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, 475 U.S. 770 (1984).
185
475 U.S. at 781. The respondent published a national magazine and the
petitioner was a New York resident with limited contacts in the forum state of
New Hampshire. New Hampshire was the only state that would not have barred
the action due to the expiration of the statute of limitations since it had not yet
run in New Hampshire.
186
Id. at 774-75.
187
Id. at 779.
188
465 U.S. at 789.
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respondent brought a libel action against the writer and editor of an
allegedly defamatory article that appeared in the National
Enquirer.189 Jones was a California resident, and both the writer
and editor were Florida residents with no relevant contacts in
California.190 The magazine’s largest circulation was in California
and the respondent lived and worked in California, so the Court
held that the circumstances were such that petitioners could
reasonably anticipate being brought to answer suit there.191 This
“purposeful availment” test is satisfied when the nonresident
committed an intentional act that was expressly aimed at the forum
and caused harm to the plaintiff, most of which the defendant knew
would occur in that forum.192
The Internet should affect the analysis in defamation cases
because its borderlessness affects the circumstances upon which
defamation cases are based. There has been no clear standard to
emerge involving jurisdiction and the Internet, and more
specifically, pertaining to personal jurisdiction and the Internet. In
approaching this issue, the courts have built on pre-existing
standards applied to traditional print publications.193 For instance,
in Young v. New Haven Advocate194 it was not sufficient, for
asserting jurisdiction, that the defendant placed information on the
Internet that could be read in the forum state.195 Rather, a
189

Id. at 784.
Id. at 785-86. Both the distributor and the national magazine made no
objection to the jurisdiction of the California court. Id. at 785.
191
Id. at 790.
192
Id. at 788-90.
193
See generally Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002) (refusing to
recognize jurisdiction in Texas when there were no substantial contacts with
Texas and the Internet bulletin posting at issue was not targeted to Texas);
Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that the
defendant newspapers did not have sufficient Internet contacts with the forum
state as they did not manifest intent to target Virginia readers).
194
315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002).
195
Id. at 263. Connecticut sent prisoners to correctional facilities in
Virginia due to overcrowding in the state’s own prison system. A newspaper in
Connecticut reported on the controversy that arose from this as well as a class
action lawsuit that had been filed against the warden. The warden brought this
action for libel relying on the newspapers Internet based contacts to establish
jurisdiction. Id. at 258-60.
190
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defendant needs to manifest intent to target and focus on readers in
the forum state.196 By requiring that the publishers intentionally
target content over the Internet to the forum state, the publisher has
the ability to limit where they will be brought to suit. Among the
fifty states, this could help insulate small publishers from suit in
foreign states due to their online publications. There is uncertainty
as to whether this would apply in an international context.
In Keeton, the Court focused on the defendants’ contact with
the forum state and relied on this contact to substantiate
jurisdiction.197 Hustler knew that the magazine was published in
New Hampshire, and by publishing in that state, Hustler assumed a
risk of being sued there.198 In Calder, the Court seems to adopt a
different view of contact by relying on the defendant’s knowledge
of impact in the forum state and the inherent wrongfulness of the
publication.199 In Young, the court’s approach recognizes the
problems that the Internet could have for publishers if mere posting
online was sufficient.200 That court analyzed whether a publisher
had intentionally targeted the state at issue.201 How the Supreme
Court will determine defamation law jurisdiction on the Internet
has yet to be established, and in an international context, the
problems may be more challenging because of the different weight
placed on the location of the harm. Only in Calder did the harm
play a significant impact in the Court’s analysis, and by using the
reasoning of this case, it would be easy to substantiate jurisdiction
in an international forum if the defendant knew that the content
would be directed there and would cause harm in that jurisdiction.
B. Jurisdictional Analysis in an International Context
In defamation suits, the benefits and consequences of forum
shopping among U.S. states may be limited because differences in
substantive law are restricted by the supremacy of the First
196
197
198
199
200
201

Id.
475 U.S. at 778-79.
Id. at 779.
465 U.S. at 788-89.
315 F.3d at 263.
Id.
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Amendment.202 When defamation occurs on an international scale,
conflicting international standards on freedom of speech gives rise
to contrary outcomes. This threat to foreign defendants should
compel a more forgiving jurisdictional analysis, to prevent
plaintiffs from regularly shopping for and pursuing actions in the
forum with the most favorable laws for recovery. But, often the
jurisdictional analysis reflects the underlying laws and values of
the home country. For example, in the UK and Australia,
compensating the harm to the plaintiff’s reputation is the dominant
concern of the courts; therefore, jurisdiction is justified based on
where that harm occurs.203
When the Australian case Dow Jones v. Gutnik204 was decided,
Internet publishers everywhere trembled at the decision’s potential
impact on their way of doing business.205 This was the first major
decision by the highest court of a country ruling on the
jurisdictional reach of the Internet.206 The plaintiff Gutnik was an
Australian citizen engaged in business activity both in Australia
and abroad.207 An article in Barron’s magazine alluded to his
participation in illegal activities with an individual recently
convicted of tax evasion, and the article was available online

202

Only cases involving private figures and matters of private concern have
not been given explicit First Amendment protection. Even in matters involving
private figures and matters of public concern, the Court has established a
minimum standard for both fault and falsity. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345-47;
Philadelphia Newspapers, 475 U.S. at 769. The states are free to adopt stricter
rules than that. Further, in Keeton, the Court only resolved the jurisdictional
issue and specifically declined to determine which choice of law would apply.
465 U.S. at 778 n.9.
203
Dow Jones v. Gutnik (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575, 606-07. (Austl.); King v.
Lewis [2004] I.L.Pr. 31 (Q.B.D.) (U.K.).
204
Though this note primarily focuses on the UK and the US, the impact of
this Australian decision on the jurisdictional issue deserves to be mentioned.
Gutnik is an Australian citizen who is the chairman of a publicly traded
company with activities in both Australia and abroad. The company is engaged
in philanthropic, political, sporting and religious activity. Dow Jones, 210
C.L.R. at 594.
205
Bari, supra note 20, at 123.
206
Felicity Barringer, Internet Makes Dow Jones Open to Suit in Australia,
N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2002, at C6.
207
Dow Jones, 210 C.L.R. at 594.
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through the Wall Street Journal website.208 Gutnik sued strictly for
damage to his reputation in his home state of Victoria, Australia,
despite his connections to the United States and an interest in his
reputation there.209
The publication process could implicate several possible
forums. The article was written in New York, uploaded onto the
Internet in New Jersey, and, for the purposes of this decision, read
in Victoria, Australia.210 Dow Jones argued for a single publication
rule determining that the upload location was the place of
publication for consistency and conformity in law, but the court
decided to evaluate the place where the defamation occurred based
on the policies underlying the law that made the conduct illegal.211
The Court ultimately decided that defamation occurs where the
damage to reputation occurs, so the place of publication is the
location of the download.212 Since this action was limited to harm
that occurred in Australia, the Court limited the suit to damages for
the harm to his reputation only in Victoria.213
The Court weighed the various policy concerns pertaining to
the reach of the Internet and the differing laws of the countries
involved, and they also considered comparable case law in other
countries when reaching this decision.214 The court found two
compelling reasons for exercising jurisdiction. First, Australia’s
interest in compensating the harm to Gutnik’s reputation in their
territory; and second, the concern about American encroachment
into Internet litigation since many web servers operate in the
US.215 Acknowledging that the rationale in the decision could
create jurisdiction anywhere in the world, the court tried to limit
the potential reach of the decision and suggested limits to scale
back the potential for numerous lawsuits throughout the world for
208

Id. Of the 550,000 subscribers to the website, approximately 1,700
resided in Australia. Only a small amount of the overall print version was also
sold in Australia. Werley, supra note 14, at 202.
209
Dow Jones, 210 C.L.R. at 595.
210
Id. at 606-07.
211
Id. at 598-601.
212
Id. at 607.
213
Id. at 604.
214
Bari, supra note 20, at 129.
215
Dow Jones, 210 C.L.R. at 613-14.
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the same piece of speech.216 Regardless, this decision implies that
the online publisher of any article containing allegedly defamatory
material viewed in Australia could be brought to suit in Australia,
and by extension of this law, anywhere else in the world where the
alleged defamatory article was read.
The Dow Jones approach is similar to the approach used in the
UK. In King v. Lewis, publication was held to be where the
information was accessed.217 It did not matter whether the
information was targeted to England, only that it was viewed
there.218 The British courts have adopted the view that “publication
is regarded as taking place where the defamatory words are
published in the sense of being heard or read.”219 The location of
the harm is the location of the reputational injury. The result is that
even though the circumstances of the case might indicate both
minimal contact and minimal reputation damage in the UK (such
as in King, Polanski and Mahfouz), the court will still assert
jurisdiction regardless of more appropriate fora.
In the US, the defendant must perform conduct intentionally
directed at the proposed jurisdiction to be found liable in that
jurisdiction.220 When information is posted on a website, the
plaintiff needs to establish that the information was purposefully
directed at the forum state.221 The place of publication is not solely
where the harm occurs. In contrast, in some foreign jurisdictions
216

Id. at 609. For example, if the suit concerned damage to reputation in a
foreign state, the action would be considered under the laws of that state. Also,
the court suggested that plaintiffs are unlikely to sue in a given forum unless the
judgment would be of real value, and they cannot sue unless they have an
established reputation in that forum. Id.
217
King v. Lewis [2004] I.L.Pr.31 (Q.B.D.) King is a well-known boxing
promoter. He was engaged in a public battle with Judd Bernstein over a rematch
between boxers Mike Tyson and Lennox Lewis. The suit was based on
statements Mr. Bernstein made in an interview about Mr. King that appeared on
the boxingtalk.com website. King claimed the statements implied that he is an
anti-Semite and this damaged his reputation among the boxing community in
London. Id.
218
Id.
219
Id. See e.g, Berezovsky v. Michaels [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1004.
220
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
221
Young v. New Haven, 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002). See also Revell v.
Lidov, 317 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002).
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reputation is protected above speech, and thus, jurisdiction is
determined by the place of injury, which is where the information
is received. By making the location of the harm determinative of
jurisdiction, the Court in Dow Jones created uncertainty for online
publishers concerning which rule of law to use as a guide.222 The
competing interests of the parties and the law in general seem to be
balanced as in other defamation cases, but by placing the
paramount importance on reputation, the courts seem to
acknowledge but disregard the greater impact this approach could
have on speech and foreign publishers in general.
III. ENFORCEMENT
Rachel Ehrenfeld’s case is of particular interest right now
because she is asking a US court not to enforce the default
judgment entered against her in England. She argues that
recognition of the English judgment would violate the US
Constitution since the two countries operate under conflicting
defamation laws.223 US case law, as it stands, supports her
position.224 Courts are not required to give effect to foreign
judgments that are contrary to public policy.225 Most foreign
judgments in libel suits have thus far not been enforced in the US,
as the judgments are considered repugnant to our Constitution.226
These decisions recognize that attempts to chill speech do not
comport with the protections afforded by the First Amendment;
however, this counter-measure is of limited relief to American
222

Werley, supra note 14, at 231.
Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, No. 1:04-CV09641 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 23, 2005).
224
See, e.g., Bachchan v. India Abroad Pubs., 585 N.Y.S. 2d 661 (1992).
See also, Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230 (1997). There is a question as
to whether this action is ripe for adjudication since Mahfouz has not attempted
to enforce the action in the United States. This issue will be discussed later in
the section.
225
Jeremy Maltby, Note: Juggling Comity and Self-Government: The
Enforcement of Foreign Libel Judgments in US Courts, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1978, 1983-87 (1994).
226
See, e.g., Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d 661. See also Telnikoff, 702 A.2d
230.
223
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publishers.
A. US Case Law
Justice Cardozo wrote: “The courts are not free to refuse to
enforce a foreign right . . . unless help would violate some
fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of
good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common
weal[th].”227 Court decisions among the several states are enforced
pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution.228
Typically, state courts will enforce international judgments as a
matter of policy, though there is no corresponding federal
requirement.229 This principle of recognition attempts to balance
the relationship of civil governments to each other as well as the
rights of the individual parties.230 However, New York, along with
several other states, has enacted laws allowing for the nonrecognition of foreign money judgments when the cause of action
on which the judgment is based is repugnant to public policy.231 As
expected, determining which judgments are repugnant to public
policy is difficult, and sometimes arbitrary. The result is that this
ambiguous and vague phrase can take different incarnations
depending on either substantive or procedural differences among
foreign states. The New York law, and similar sister state laws,
apparently reflect a policy that enforcement of the foreign law
would diminish comparable law in the United States.232
In libel actions, some courts have held that differences among
foreign nations in standards of proof and protection of speech are

227

Loucks v. Standard Oil of New York, 224 N.Y. 99, 111 (1918).
U.S. CONST. Art. IV. Sec. 1.
229
Arthur von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Recognition of Foreign
Adjudications: A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1601,
1602 (1968).
230
Id. at 1603-04.
231
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5304. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS §117.
232
See, e.g., Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230, 250 (1997)
(reasoning that recognition of the English defamation judgment could lead to a
wholesale circumvention of fundamental public policy).
228
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sufficient to qualify as repugnant.233 In Bachchan v. India Abroad
Publications,234 a New York court refused to enforce an English
defamation action in the US, because it was repugnant to the US
Constitution.235 The story at issue was written by a reporter in
London working for a New York newspaper and was transmitted
to papers in India and the US and distributed in the UK.236 The
court did not consider which jurisdiction would have been
appropriate or the interests of other foreign states in enforcing the
judgment, and instead focused on the substantive law in
question.237 The court here held that the standard of proof in
English defamation cases violates the US Constitution and results
in a chilling effect on the media.238 The repugnance lay in the
domestic effect of recognizing the judgment in the US.239 The case
suggests that First Amendment rights are so fundamental that laws
without such a right are per se repugnant.240
The New York court seemed to approach the case as if the two
laws were inherently in conflict and struck the law down with only
a cursory analysis of the actual law and judgment at issue.241 In
Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, the Maryland court reached the same
conclusion, but the judgment was reached after a thorough analysis
of the history and application of the two countries’ laws before
refusing enforcement.242 Telnikoff was an English citizen who
233

Telnikoff,702 A.2d at 250; Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications, 585
N.Y.S.2d 661 (1992).
234
585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1992). See also Maltby, supra note 225, at 1983-93.
235
Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
236
Id. at 661-62.
237
It is arguable that freedom of speech was not being exercised based on
the circumstances of this case. The story was predominantly written and
published and caused the complaining party damage outside of the United
States. Based on these circumstances, the court would not necessarily be
violating the First Amendment in enforcing the judgment because American
speech concerns are not as significantly involved. Craig A. Stern, Foreign
Judgments and the Freedom of Speech: Look Who’s Talking, 60 BROOK. L. REV.
999, 1035 (1994).
238
Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 664.
239
Stern, supra note 237, at 1030.
240
Id. at 1000.
241
Id. at 999.
242
Telnikoff, 702 A.2d at 239-51.
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brought the suit in British court for the alleged defamatory
statements Matusevitch, an American citizen, made in a letter
published in the Daily Telegraph responding to statements that
Telnikoff had made in a radio broadcast.243 Telnikoff was
successful in the UK, and then came to the US to have the
judgment enforced under principles of comity.244 The court
observed that the standards governing defamation law in the two
countries are “totally different . . . in virtually every significant
respect.”245 These differences were “rooted in historic and
fundamental public policy differences concerning freedom of the
press and speech.”246 The court reached its decision
acknowledging the concern that “recognition of English
defamation judgments could lead to wholesale circumvention of
fundamental public policy.”247
The above cases start with a foreign complainant’s attempt to
enforce the judgment in the US, and the analysis changes slightly
when the enforcement by the foreign plaintiff has not yet been
sought in the US. In such a situation, whether the US court can
assert jurisdiction becomes a potential bar to an assertion of one’s
First Amendment rights. This precise issue was recently
considered in Yahoo! v. La Lingue Contra Le Racisme et
L’Antisemitisme (LICRA)248 by an en banc Ninth Circuit Court.249
The American company’s auction site contained Nazi memorabilia
that could be accessed in France by French citizens in violation of
French laws prohibiting Nazi memorabilia.250 The French court
ordered certain measures to be taken to restrict access or remove
the merchandise from the site and instituted significant fines for

243

Id. at 232-36. The alleged defamatory statements included accusing
Telnikoff of being a racist, an anti-Semite, and a proponent of racial purity. Id.
244
Id.
245
Id. at 248.
246
Id.
247
Id. at 250.
248
433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006). Yahoo! was sued in France because its
US web site, accessible in France, contained Nazi paraphernalia; France has
laws prohibiting such speech.
249
Id. at 1202-03.
250
Id.
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non-compliance.251 Yahoo! sought declaratory relief in the US,
claiming that the French order would infringe on the First
Amendment and as such was unenforceable in the US.252 The
District Court decided in favor of Yahoo! and granted the
declaratory relief because enforcement of the French judgment
against the U.S.-based company would effectively chill speech and
is contrary to public policy.253
In Yahoo!, the District Court looked to Bachchan and Telnikoff
for guidance, and considered the new issue in light of the problems
created by the extensive reach of the Internet.254 In this case, the
French ruling has a simultaneous chilling effect in the United
States because the Internet makes the information widely
available.255 As such, the First Amendment concerns regarding the
potential chilling effect on speech outweigh the principal of
comity.256 The en banc court, however, did not see the issue ripe
for adjudication.257 There was no indication that the French
judgment would be enforced against Yahoo! as the company was
already mostly in compliance and also the French order does not
impact users in the US.258 The court chose to act prudentially, but
leaves open the possibility to revisit the First Amendment issue
should the impact of the order be felt by American users.259
The outcome of the Yahoo! case could influence a judgment in
Dr. Ehrenfeld’s pending case. Yahoo! raises the important question
as to whether the plaintiff in a libel suit is required to seek
enforcement in US courts before US courts can consider the merits
251

Id.
Id. at 1201.
253
160 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1194 (N.D. Cal. 2001), rev’d, 379 F.3d 1120 (9th
Cir. 2004), rehearing en banc granted, 399 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. Feb. 10, 2005)
(NO. 01-17424).
254
Yahoo!, 160 F. Supp 2d at 1192.
255
Id. at 1192.
256
Id. at 1193.
257
Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1201. On the eleven judge panel, eight judges held
that the court had personal jurisdiction over the defendants. Of this eight, five
judges concluded that the issue was ripe for adjudication and three concluded
that it was not. Three judges determined that the issue should be dismissed for
lack of personal jurisdiction. Id.
258
Id. at 1218-20.
259
Id. at 1223-24.
252
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of their claim, and more specifically the First Amendment
conflicts. In Yahoo! the court held that the issue was not ripe for
adjudication, but the factual differences between the two cases do
not necessarily guarantee the same result. The French order aims to
restrict content in France but says nothing of comparable content in
the US or any other territory where the site might reach.
Ehrenfeld’s case directly implicates freedom of expression because
it focuses on speech involving a matter of public concern without
regard to context. There is no indication of an attempt to enforce
the French order against Yahoo!, unless circumstances change.
Also, without direct implications in the US, the court in Yahoo! is
concerned that this would amount to an extraterritorial application
of the First Amendment.260 One concern expressed regarding Dr.
Ehrenfeld’s situation is that if Mahfouz never attempts to enforce
the monetary judgment in the US, she will always be forced to deal
with the implications of the judgment in the British courts. It
affects her reputation and credibility as a journalist, and the
looming monetary judgment could cause financial harm both in
terms of her credit as well as the imminent possibility of having to
honor the judgment or fight it legally.261 It is unclear whether
Mahfouz will seek enforcement of the judgment in the US. This
tactic could simply be used to dissuade future investigations by
those skeptical of his political ties.262 His website citing victories
against journalists and including their court ordered apologies
could then be his warning statement.
The enforcement of an English libel judgment could have the
effect of chilling the speech of US media companies. On a larger
scale, the Yahoo! decision by the Ninth Circuit could be seen as
implicitly accepting the foreign judgment in spite of US laws.
Yahoo! would either have to completely abide by the French order
or risk incurring substantial fines for non-compliance that may

260

Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1217-18.
Brief for Amazon.com et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs,
Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, 04-CV-09641, 2005 WL 696769 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 23,
2005),
available
at
http://www.publicintegrity.org/publications/publications061105.htm.
262
Lyall, supra note 1.
261
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someday be enforced.263 In essence, it would be subject to the
speech restrictions of French law despite the legal protections
afforded to it in the company’s home country.264 But, the court was
clear that the decision could change should the impact of the
speech restrictions be felt on American soil.265 The Bachchan and
Telnikoff cases and the District Court’s ruling in Yahoo! v. LICRA
suggest that enforcement would chill speech in the US.266 Either
enforcement of a judgment or denial of a declaratory judgment
would suggest that there are limits to the First Amendment’s
guarantee. On the other hand, principles of comity are widely
recognized and accepted among foreign nations, and enforcement
of a foreign judgment might not have such a troublesome impact
by suggesting that the First Amendment offers less protection than
previously thought.267
An author or publisher facing a libel lawsuit in a foreign court
cannot necessarily rely on the US courts to disregard the judgment
as their sole means of protection. With the globalization of the
media, many publishing companies have global offices and assets.
In those cases, the defamed party does not necessarily need the
assistance of US courts to enforce the judgment. The judgment can
be enforced against the assets in the foreign state, even if the
defendant also has assets in the US.268 Any magazine or newspaper
that has a foreign news office in London or transacts other business
in the United Kingdom will be subject to suit there regardless of
263

Yahoo! v. LICRA, 160 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1185 (N.D. Cal. 2001). The
order assed fines of approximately $13,000 per day for non-compliance after a
three-month allowance period. Id.
264
Id. at 1192-93.
265
This enforces the proposition that Americans should abide by foreign
laws when operating in a foreign country. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Defamation
in the Digital Age: Some Comparative Law Observations on the Difficulty of
Reconciling Free Speech and Reputation in the Emerging Global Village, 62
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 339, 351 (2005).This could have interesting implications
if applied to defamation law.
266
See Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 234-35; Telnikoff, 702 A.2d at 250-01;
Yahoo!, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1192-93.
267
Mark D. Rosen, Should “Un-American” Foreign Judgments Be
Enforced?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 783, 862 (2004).
268
Martin Davies, Time to Change the Federal Forum Non Conveniens
Analysis, 77 TUL. L. REV. 309, 349 (1964).
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whether the principle nature of their work is reporting for a USbased publication or whether their work is actually published in the
UK. Ehrenfeld’s situation is unique in today’s world since, as an
individual author, she does not have assets in the UK like many
international publishing companies; her situation now seems more
the exception than the rule.269
IV. THE CONFLICT
Both the US and the UK recognize the value of a free and open
discussion of public affairs.270 The countries, however, place
different weight on what speech is protected, and as a result, create
serious implications for the value of free speech. This impacts the
conduct of American journalists in the global media market. The
possibility of being subject to libel suits in countries not offering
the same protections as the First Amendment can force journalists
to think twice about potential consequences before publishing their
work.271 The limitations imposed by foreign courts could
encourage responsible journalism, but professional standards and
the market for news arguably encourage this responsibility
already.272 However, these limitations could also cause a chilling
effect on the media and stymie their willingness to publish
controversial, yet important, information by taking away First
Amendment protections.273
269

Rachel Ehrenfeld is currently unable to travel in the UK because of the
judgment pending against her, which potentially hinders professional
opportunities. Rachel Ehrenfeld, Banned in The U.K., FrontPageMage.com, Oct.
26, 2005, http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp ?ID=19950.
270
See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964);
Reynolds v. Times Newspaper, [2001] 2.A.C. 127, 200 (U.K.).
271
To an extent, this has already happened. In an ABA-sponsored survey
on Global Internet Jurisdiction, more than half of the media company
respondents indicated that they have adjusted their business operations in
response to the risk posed by Internet jurisdiction and its implications. Michael
Geist, Global Internet Jurisdiction: The ABA/ ICC Survey (Apr. 2004), available
at www.abanet.org/buslaw/newsletter/ 0023/materials/js.pdf.
272
Keith Schilling, The Americanization of English Libel Laws, ENT. L.
REV. 2000, 11(3), 48-49.
273
See generally Kohler, supra note 10, at 1206-13 (discussing possible
stories that would not have come to light with a less restrictive defamation

MALY MACROED CORRECTED 7-30-06.DOC

924

7/30/2006 12:36 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

It is difficult to resolve a conflict between two nations that is
based on inherent differences between each nation’s priorities.
Both countries promote free expression and consider it a means to
a democratic government, and so the roots of the concept of
freedom of expression are similar.274 The differences in
application, though, are substantial, and in the global media
market, create considerable discrepancy as to which libel law
governs various publications.275 In application, one law trumps the
other.276 Principles of comity in respecting foreign law and foreign
judgments seem to be disregarded because of the importance
placed on regulating speech and the interests to be protected.277
American defendants will undoubtedly continue to be sued in
foreign jurisdictions without First Amendment protections, and
there are currently no clear recourses available to American
defendants, publishers, courts or policy makers faced with this
problem. Even more problematic for those involved with American
media, is that the domestic solutions that do exist seem
insufficient. Americans would reject the first hint of a solution that
would diminish the protections of the First Amendment in the
standard than New York Times); Weaver, supra note 122, at 1287-88 and 131112 (discussing the possibility of a hypothetical Watergate situation under British
law).
274
See discussion supra Part I.
275
For example, in Polanski, discussed supra Part I.B.2, Vanity Fair could
have been subject to suit in the US where it publishes, in the UK where it had a
small circulation, or in France where Polanski lives and the magazine also has a
small circulation. What if he had been filming a movie in the Czech Republic
when the article was released? This further raises the question of whether he
could have sued in the Czech Republic for the damage done to his reputation
there.
276
For example, when looking at the relevant cases in both the U.K. and
the U.S., each country decides to adopt their own laws and specifically refuses
to enforce the other. In Reynolds, the Court did consider the American law in
reaching their decision. 2 A.C. at 198-201. Further, in Polanski, the British court
was willing to apply U.K. laws over an American publisher for a predominantly
American publication. Dow Jones, 210 C.L.R. at 612-13. In the US, by refusing
to enforce foreign libel judgments in both Bachchan and Telkinoff, the American
courts recognize supremacy of American law over the British courts’ decisions.
Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230, 250 (1997); Bachchan v. India Abroad
Publications, 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1992).
277
Telnikoff, 702 A.2d at 250; Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 661.
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US.278 Many foreign states, fearful of any implication of the
supremacy of US law, have expressed disdain for a policy adopting
the standards for free speech as established by the US Constitution
and courts.279 This entrenched conflict in substantive law and
fundamental public policies means that any potential solution for
the media will be not easily be found in terms of jurisdiction and
enforcement.
Potential solutions have been proposed, though they are neither
easy nor satisfactory. One potential solution involves setting a
universal jurisdiction for cases involving the Internet as the means
of distribution, or more clearly defining jurisdictional rules for
international defamation.280 A second solution focuses on an
international agreement establishing a universal protocol in
defamation cases involving foreign parties.281 Finally, the third,
and most feasible option, argues that the solution exists partially
within the status quo. By expanding the current law of conflicting
countries, the solution could be remedied more satisfactorily than
by attempting to define international defamation standards.282
A. An Internet-Based Solution
One solution suggests that Internet jurisdiction should be based
on contact with the forum state without regard to the substantive
law of the defendant’s home state. This satisfies the reputationprotective nature underlying many nations’ defamation laws by
allowing the allegedly defamed to vindicate his or her reputation in
the home country where the injury is most likely felt. A major
concern regarding this effects-based approach, as adopted by both
278

Ken Kraus, Enforcement of Foreign Media Judgments in the Aftermath
of Gutnik v. Dow Jones & Co., 21 SPG COMM. LAW. 1, 25-27 (2003).
279
See generally Dow Jones v. Gutnik (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575, 606-07.
(Austl.); Reynolds v. Times Newspaper, [2001] 2.A.C. 127, 200 (U.K.). See also
Jonathan Harris, Forum Shopping in International Libel, L.Q.R. 2000, 116
(OCT), 562, 568.
280
See supra Part IV.A.
281
This is not a new solution, and an international agreement certainly has
been attempted, especially for jurisdictional concerns. See, e.g., Kraus, supra
note 278.
282
See supra Part IV.C.
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Australia and the UK, is the chilling effect on publishers being
afraid of foreign suit from using the Internet to disseminate
information.283 In this worse case scenario, publishers could simply
choose to not post articles and information online as a means to
avoid the risk.284 Imposition of suit based on effect-based
jurisdiction could cause more impact on multi-national media
companies while having little effect on independent publishers.285
At first glance, this does not seem problematic, but the media
entities regulated by the market and public opinion might choose
silence instead of risk, while individual and potentially
irresponsible bloggers could fill the void left open.286 If a publisher
assumes that by putting information on the web, they are assuming
the risk of suit in various foreign entities, they may simply choose
not to assume the risk if the threat and costs of suits increase.287
It is unreasonable to require publishers to exercise control over
who visits their sites. The technology surrounding the Internet is
constantly evolving, and there has been some suggestion that it is
possible to attach significance to the geographical location of those
active on the Internet.288 Websites and Internet Service Providers

283

Bari, supra note 20, at 164-68.
Id.
285
Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199,
1217 (1998). For example, bloggers with no foreign assets could defame at will
because suit in a foreign jurisdiction would mean little since the judgment could
not be enforced locally. Large media entities could refrain or restrict publishing
since this effect-based approach poses more of a risk to their continued viability.
286
This is certainly a worse case scenario and too extreme to likely ever
happen. But regardless, this effects-based approach highlights the inconsistent
treatment of various publishers. In international defamation actions, the standard
fails to punish defamatory speech and instead, real success is often
determinative on whether the speaker has assets in a particular location. While
that summation simplifies the problem, if vindicating injury to reputation is the
goal, this seems to miss the mark unless the actual judgment is all the alleged
defamed individual hopes to achieve.
287
This will be looked at through a cost-benefit analysis later in this
section.
288
Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, Geo-Location Technologies and Other
Means of Placing Borders on the ‘Borderless’ Internet, 23 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 101, 101 (2004). According to the estimates of two expert
witnesses in the Yahoo! case, it is possible to achieve a filtering success rate of
284

MALY MACROED CORRECTED 7-30-06.DOC

7/30/2006 12:36 PM

FORUM SHOPPING IN LIBEL LAW LITIGATION

927

(ISPs) do filter content based on user location.289 It is not
uncommon for larger sites to require users who visit and read
content on the site to register.290 Publishers could attempt to block
access to every country with objectionable laws, but this is not an
easy undertaking.291 This is an unsatisfactory alternative because
many online publishers might not have the means to accomplish
this ‘blackout’,292 due to the high costs of such measures.293 This

90% through geographical identification of IP addresses and a declaration of
nationality
289
Joel R. Reidenberg, Technology and Internet Jurisdiction, 153 U. PA. L.
REV. 1951, 1962 (2005). According to the estimates of two expert witnesses in
the Yahoo! case, it is possible to achieve a filtering success rate of 90% through
geographical identification of IP addresses and a declaration of nationality. A
third expert doubts this number due to its reliance on users to respond truthfully
under the honor system. Yahoo! v. LICRA, 433 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2006).
290
See, e.g. Dow Jones, 2 C.L.R. at 129.
291
A publisher would literally have to block access to the entire country
with unfavorable laws. There could be no click-through contract or the like since
a third party’s actions can substantiate suit. The contract would not be able to be
one enforceable between the actual parties. Also, corporations would have to
hire lawyers familiar with each country’s laws or make a publishing judgment
based on the least offensive material to satisfy the most stringent country’s laws.
Content filtering may help to avoid liability internationally, but it could also
result in a global chilling effect on both speech and online commerce. Jay
Wahlquist, The World Summit on the Information Society: Making the Case for
Private Industry Filtering to Control Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and
Transnational Internet Censorship Conflicts, 1 INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 283, 289
(2005).
292
This was one of the problems cited in Yahoo!. Yahoo! claimed it did not
have the means to restrict access of the content from France, thus resulting in a
chill on its speech. Yahoo! v. LICRA, 160 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1184-85 (N.D. Cal.
2001). However, Google is currently blocking certain search results on the
Google.cn website in cooperation with the Chinese government. Joseph Kahn,
So Long Dalai Lama: Google Adapts to China, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2006, at §
4. Google does disclose when searches are being censored. Id. Due to the size of
the Chinese market, it might be more damaging to completely pull out of the
market. David Barboza, Version of Google in China Won’t Offer E-Mail or
Blogs, N.Y, TIMES, Jan. 25, 2006, at § C3. This does suggest that the technology
is possible, but it does not necessarily mean that it is financially worthwhile in
many situations. In both the Yahoo! case and a similar case involving
CompuServe in Germany, the Internet Service Provider chose to block the
offensive content rather than spend resources utilizing nation specific targeting.
Wahlquist, supra note 291 at 289-90.
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could also disproportionately affect ISPs, as they become a target
for such actions even if individual users place the offensive content
online.294 Further, evasive measures exist for those who do not
want to be linked to, and thus limited by, their geographic location,
and this would stymie efforts at jurisdiction control.
Suppose the international community adopts an approach
similar to the one adopted by the US in Young v. New Haven
Advocate295 and requires that the publisher purposefully targets the
forum state to be subject to jurisdiction there. A website operator
who knows the location of a visitor to his or her site can limit the
contacts with certain jurisdictions based on that information.296
Through advertising and content, a publisher can target certain
countries and avoid others. This would improve the ability to
anticipate applicable laws and avoid jurisdictions with unfavorable
laws. This is also not as tenuous a link to jurisdiction as mere
accessibility of a website in a forum.
Either of the above suggestions limiting Internet jurisdiction
ultimately limit the ability of a party to bring suit for defamation.
An individual named in a potentially defamatory article might not
have the means to view or read such article and respond to the
allegations. In the alternative, an individual may be able to read
and access the information but not pursue the action in their home
jurisdiction because the site did not specifically target that country.
293

A blogger interested in world politics who regularly airs complaints
about foreign leaders should not be provided less protection against foreign
defamation actions than the large media conglomerate who can afford to impose
the viewing restriction, especially since it might not be necessary to have this
blocking protection due to the number of people who view the site. Arguably,
this solution might achieve a market balance in a way. Independent American
bloggers and the like will unlikely have foreign assets, and so the judgment will
not be enforced in the US. This underestimates the legal expenses in defending
suit here and the effect of having a defamation judgment on record in a foreign
country. The media entities with the means to limit viewing also likely have
assets in those countries, and so the restriction option works for them in the way
that the enforcement option, as used in Bachchan, will not.
294
Wahlquist, supra note 291, at 292. There is a greater incentive to go
after ISPs than individual users as the effects of actions to restrict content will
have greater reach than merely targeting individual users. Id.
295
315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002).
296
Svantesson, supra note 288, at 103-04.
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Reputation-protective countries might take issue with the
restrictions, and to an extent they already have.297 The restrictions
limit an individual’s ability to vindicate their reputation, which is
counter to the intent and goals of some individual defamation
laws.298
The Internet solution is not limited to issues focused on access
of information. While apparently rational, the place of uploading
information to the web neither should nor could become the
controlling forum. Defendants would not have to anticipate suit in
foreign states because they could choose the applicable laws by
choosing where to publish or, as pertains to the Internet, upload.299
This solution is appealing to American media because it allows
them to continue to operate solely under the protections of US law,
and could give the broadest reach and force of the First
Amendment. This solution then puts the US in the position to
become a host location to many media companies, by offering
more media protective laws.300 But, this solution, while arguably
the most media protective, is also highly unrealistic. It imposes US
defamation law on foreign nations when the defamatory statement
at issue is published electronically despite the fact the US approach
to freedom of expression represents a minority approach.301 It
could potentially cause a race to the bottom that would heighten
the resolve of foreign courts to assert jurisdiction in their own
systems.302 Courts have already refused to recognize this definition
of publication and are unlikely to start to do so at the expense of
their own laws for the purposes of certainty in the international

297

See discussion supra Part II.B.
See discussion supra Part I.
299
Dow Jones v. Gutnik (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575, 632-33 (Austl.).
300
Id.
301
Krotoszynski, supra note 265, at 350.
302
Both Reynolds and Dow Jones considered US law in reaching their
decision and specifically refused to adopt it as counter to the reputational
interests protected in both the UK and Australia. Reynolds v. Times Newspaper,
[2001] 2.A.C. 127, 198-201 (U.K.); Dow Jones, 210 C.L.R. at 612-13. There is
also the risk that the U.S. could become a safe haven for unpopular speech, such
as hate speech. Joel R. Reidenberg, Technology and Internet Jurisdiction, 153
U. PA. L. REV. 1951, 1958 (2005).
298
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arena.303
This solution further poses a considerable imposition to
plaintiffs wanting to bring suit, and a plaintiff’s inconvenience
should factor into a courts’ decision when considering whether to
assert jurisdiction. This could be rectified by allowing plaintiffs to
pursue a suit in their home state while using the substantive law of
the defendant’s state.304 However, it is unlikely that one country’s
court will accept another’s country’s law as superior to their own
when different interests are valued.305 The plaintiff would not
suffer the inconvenience of bringing suit in a foreign state, but the
application of the differing laws of the foreign state might be as
great an imposition to suit.
B. An International Agreement
The potential of a jurisdiction-based solution, while appealing,
may not resolve the issue, especially since there is currently no
uniform rule to determine jurisdiction. A uniform, global set of
standards for information published on the Internet presents an
alternate, though likely impossible, solution to this problem.306
This model has been applied in other contexts. For example, the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)
maintains the uniformity of domain names and other unique
identifiers.307 The Berne Convention oversees international
copyright protection,308 and the Hague Convention is attempting to
resolve uncertainty in online contracts through Internet jurisdiction

303

See discussion supra Part II.B.
The court in Dow Jones did suggest that if the action was for defamation
in more than one state, due consideration might be given to the laws of that state
when reaching the jurisdiction. Since this case was limited to damage caused in
Victoria, there was no need to fully analyze this option. 210 C.L.R. at 609.
305
Werley supra note 14, at 222-23.
306
Bari, supra note 20, at 167. See also, Marc H. Greenberg A Return to
Lilliput: The LICRA v. Yahoo! Case and the Regulation of Online Content in
the World Market, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1191, 1250 (2003).
307
See www.icann.org.
308
18 Am. Jur. 2d Copyright and Literary Property § 202.
304
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through an international treaty.309 In defamation contexts, the
possibility that such an agreement will be adopted on an
international scale is unlikely.310 It is doubtful that a country will
forfeit its own laws or limit the effect of such laws to an
international standard based on different ideals.311 In defamation
actions, the contested issue involves each country’s values, and it
would likely be harder to reach a consistent arrangement when
values are at issue.312 In the US, any agreement that diminishes
First Amendment protection would likely suffer constitutional
challenges at home.313
However, an international agreement need not sweep so
broadly. If it is unrealistic to assume that countries would reach an
agreement on defamation law in general due to differing values as
to what speech should be protected, there is no reason that the
agreement could not be limited in its scope. For example, an
agreement could limit jurisdiction to the plaintiff’s home venue or
the publisher’s home venue. This could limit libel tourism but it
still does not adequately protect reputational interests, as it might
exclude a person’s place of business or any other basis for
jurisdiction in a location where a person’s reputation may have
been injured. The agreement could also focus on damages, such as
limiting recovery of damages to actual injury suffered in that
jurisdiction, or limiting the number of locations in which a party
could pursue a defamation action for a particular publication.
These limitations could rein in forum shopping, but it leaves the
question as to whether parties would agree to this more willingly
309

Members of the Hague convention have attempted this with
enforcement. Krause, supra note 278, at 25-26. Part of the problem in reaching
an agreement in the Hague Convention is that it would require the US to enforce
foreign judgments. It could mean that a business would be vulnerable to suit
anywhere in the world. Denis T. Rice, Problems in Running a Global Internet
Business: Complying with the Laws of Other Countries, 797 PLI/PAT 11, 36
(2004).
310
Bari, supra note 20, at 167. See also Greenberg, supra note 306, at
1250.
311
Id.
312
Timofeeva, supra note 20, at 223. “Given the divergent policies and
values embraced by governments throughout the world, arriving at an
international agreement seems nearly impossible at this time.” Id.
313
Bari, supra note 20, at 167.
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than another international jurisdiction or defamation-based
agreement. In the alternative, the proposed international agreement
could focus on the choice of law and be reached as a compromise
over two conflicting sets of laws among nations.314
C. A Solution Within the Current Law
One impetus of the decision in New York Times was free
exchange of ideas and information, and as such, the Court
determined that speech should be over-protected rather than underprotected.315 The Court feared that requiring a showing of truth to
prevent unreasonably high libel judgments would result in selfcensorship.316 This self-censorship, as compelled by the state
through libel laws, limits public debate.317 With limited legal
protection for speech, publishers would err on the side of caution
by choosing not to publish, rather than risk the threat of suit.318
When the Court extended the New York Times “actual malice”
standard beyond matters involving public officials, it implicitly
recognized the value of free speech in those other contexts.319
British journalists recognize the chilling effect that their

314

Krotoszynski, supra note 265, at 351. For example, if the Europeans do
not like the US antitrust laws, they could agree to recognize a safe harbor for
defamation actions pursued in their nations while the US agrees to recognize a
safe harbor for certain antitrust violations. Id.
315
Harry Kalvern, Jr. The New York Times Case: A Note on “the Central
Meaning on the First Amendment” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 213 (1964)
(discussing the effects of the Supreme Court decision and its potential impact on
the tort of defamation).
316
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all
his factual assertions- and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually
unlimited in amount leads to a comparable self-censorship . . . .The rule
thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate. It is
inconsistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Id.
317
Id.
318
Id.
319
See discussion supra Part I.A.2.
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country’s laws have on their work.320 Publication decisions are
made not just by the author and editors, but also attorneys, based
on the availability of proof and the potential for a lawsuit.321
British journalists even suggest that a journalism-spurred
investigation like Watergate would not have been able to happen in
the UK due to the reluctance of publishers to publish legally
inadmissible evidence.322 The British courts are cognizant of the
potential chilling effect on the media and allow exceptions.323 In
Reynolds, the freedom to disseminate political information was
said to be essential to the proper functioning of the established
democracy, but the Court stopped short of extending media
protection in the vein of the New York Times standard since the
protection of reputation is “conducive to the public good.”324 If no
privilege is found to exist on balance with protecting one’s
reputation, then the only means for relief is proving the truth of the
statements.325 This can be difficult.326 Imposing this reputationprotective standard on American publishers circumvents US laws
and could chill US speech if Americans are increasingly forced to
defend defamation cases under British laws. The decisions in the
Polanski and Ehrenfeld cases in the UK suggest the ease with
which the First Amendment can be disregarded simply by
changing jurisdictions.327
This concern over a chilling effect is validated by the fact that
Dr. Ehrenfeld’s British publisher cancelled publication of her book
on the mere threat of a lawsuit.328 Another journalist, Craig Unger,
faced a similar fate in England over his book on the relationship
between the Saudi Royal Family and the Bush family.329 The
320

See generally Weaver, supra note 109 (reporting interviews with
journalists on Reynolds and its implications in their profession).
321
Id.
322
Weaver, supra note 122, at 1287-88, 1311-12.
323
Reynolds v. Times Newspaper, [2001] 2.A.C. 127, 192 (U.K.).
324
Id. at 200-01.
325
See supra Part I.B.1.
326
See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
327
Supra Parts I.B.2. and III.C.
328
Lyall, supra note 1.
329
Id. Unger’s book, House of Bush, House of Saud: The Secret
Relationship Between the World’s Two Most Powerful Dynasties, became a
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British publisher of Unger’s book claimed that the lawsuit was
inevitable, and though Unger’s book was good, it was not worth
the trouble of a long and expensive suit.330 The mere threat of suit
limits the reach of the author’s publication in print form and
prevents the information from being received in the UK. If the
trend continues or worsens, publishers could take more affirmative
steps to limit the reach of the information to these jurisdictions, by
either limiting online sales or online postings. In such a case,
speech is no longer chilled, but rather frozen, because the speech is
effectively cut off from a segment of the population, such as the
entire UK audience or even the American audience, based on the
extent of the preventative measures enacted to limit the threat of
suit.
The chilling effect of international libel suits is not limited to
the publication of information, but could also extend further to the
investigative process.331 The effect of these judgments could
discourage other scholars from investigating terrorism funding or
mentioning such individuals as Mr. Mahfouz by name.332 In her
complaint filed in the Southern District of New York, Dr.
Ehrenfeld claimed, “If this action is dismissed, writers will be
afraid to do their jobs properly and aggressively, and the search for
the truth behind issues of the highest and most urgent public
interest will be compromised.”333 In the Amici Curiae brief
submitted on behalf of Dr. Ehrenfeld to the New York court,
several members of the media and international communities
jointly contended that should the British judgment be allowed to
bestseller in the U.S. and was published in Germany, Spain and Brazil, among
other places. One publishing company even considered going as far as setting up
a separate legal entity solely to publish this book in the UK. Like several other
publishing companies, however, they feared the almost inevitable libel suit. Id.
It is unlikely that the Reynolds qualified privilege would extend to Unger, and so
his only likely defense would have been to prove the truth of the allegations. See
supra note 141.
330
Id.
331
Brief for Amazon.com, supra note 261.
332
Id.
333
Mike Dodd, Ehrenfeld: International Libel Law Battle ‘IS ABOUT
FREEDOM OF SPEECH,’ PA NEWS, June 16, 2005 (quoting the Memorandum
of Law submitted to the New York Supreme Court on behalf of Ehrenfeld).
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stand, the impact would be felt by numerous authors and
publishers alike by giving effect and credibility to the tactics of
“libel tourists” such as Mahfouz.334 The media is a part of the
intelligence process, and they can only fulfill their role as
investigators with the support of the government and the law.335
Despite the potential chilling effect threatened by international
libel suits, the law as it stands does provide potential remedial
measures that are currently more realistic and workable than
creating universal Internet jurisdiction or an international
agreement. The constantly evolving technology and the substantive
differences underlying the law of international defamation make
the previous two options currently insufficient to address the
problem. Expansive definitions of the current law and current
remedial measures offer sufficient protection in this evolving
controversy.
Expanding the definition of qualified privilege may reconcile
the different laws. The laws recognize the same fundamental idea,
the importance of freedom of expression, though they accord value
to open discussion and reputation differently.336 While it may be
impossible to completely rectify them now, British law is moving
in the direction of expanding qualified privilege.337 By working
within the established guidelines of the qualified privilege
exception, there could be a more balanced solution to the current
conflict of libel laws and thus a more balanced protection for
journalists. In Reynolds, the court suggests a circumstantial test for
evaluating the qualified privilege.338 This test specifically leaves
room for interpretation.339 It is even arguably similar to the actual
malice standard in New York Times.340 In his opinion, Lord
Nicholls said that the law was supposed to be protective of the
press,341 so it should ideally live up to that requirement. However,
the decision also considered the importance of valuing reputation
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341

Brief for Amazon.com et al, supra note 261.
ROBERTSON & NICOL, supra note 22, at xviii.
See discussion supra Part I.A.1 and Part I.B.2.
Weaver, supra note 122, at 1315-16.
See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
Reynolds v. Times Newspaper, [2001] 2.A.C. 127, 204 (U.K.).
ROBERTSON & NICOL, supra note 22, at 133.
Reynolds, 2 A.C. at 205.
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in a democratic society, suggesting that it is a necessary element of
the public good.342
By adhering to the reputation-protective common law, the UK
courts could unnecessarily chill speech and harm the public
discourse without fully achieving the common law’s aim. No one
knows how the law of Reynolds will be interpreted or how far the
qualified privilege will be extended.343 A subsequent case suggests
that it will not be as protective as originally hoped.344 The
circumstances listed in Reynolds do propose a broad reading and
application of qualified privilege, but until these circumstances are
actually tested in court, there is no way to know for sure. Part of
the problem may not be the judiciary but rather the press lawyers
who err on the side of caution, and urge against publication if there
is the slight possibility of legal action.345 The law may be more
restrictive in its letter than its spirit, and members of the media
have failed to use the courts to protect their freedoms.346 The press
could also invoke the free expression principle in Article 10 of the
ECHR to challenge restrictions on their freedom.347 By reading
into the circumstances literally on such criteria as the urgency of
the publication, the privilege might not be met and the defendant
would be forced to prove the truth of the allegation. This also
could cause considerable disadvantage to book publishers who
likely do not have as strong an argument to make concerning the
urgency of the publication.348 When it concerns a matter of public
342

Id. at 201. Lord Nicholls does not seem to have much faith in the press
or their decision-making ability in terms of adequately protecting the reputation
of individuals. This seems to form a basis for the restrictions in the judgment. Id.
at 202.
343
Weaver, supra note 122, at 1315.
344
Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe [2004] E.M.L.R.11; Cram, supra
note 129. While the court recognized that terrorism was a public concern, this
did not outweigh the reputation interests of the individual linked for
participation in terrorism funding absent some urgency in disseminating the
information.
345
ROBERTSON & NICOL, supra note 22, at xiii.
346
Id. at xiv. The excessive costs of libel suits and the risk that the losing
party might potentially incur the litigation costs of both parties is further
hindrance to pursuing or defending a claim. Id. at 76-79.
347
Id.
348
Evans, supra note 149, at 33.
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interest, the reasonableness of the investigative process and the
subject matter should outweigh the injury to reputation.
If any of the above public international law solutions are
unworkable, large media companies may be able to minimize the
risks of the status quo. There are inherent conflicts in the
substantive laws of the various countries that make a satisfactory
international agreement untenable. But the media is a big business,
and the current global model allows publishers to broaden their
reach, and thus their audience considerably. If Barrons Online has
an audience in Australia and a few assets there, it might be worth
risking an occasional libel suit to reap the everyday profits
associated with running a global business,349 especially if the
damages are limited to the actual publication in that jurisdiction.350
In many situations, the costs of either instituting effective
prohibitive measures to prevent publication in certain areas or the
cost of defamation suits might not be so significant as to outweigh
the benefits of foreign publication. International corporations
assume the risk of liability in brick and mortar transactions in
foreign jurisdictions, and so there is no reason to assume that this
assumption of risk will not factor into their determination to invest
in foreign media markets.351 There is the further benefit to
American publishers of not having the First Amendment
protections watered down through an international agreement. But,
the benefits may not always outweigh the costs, and the problem of
international libel litigation might rise to the point of forcing action
or silencing global speech.

349

The Supreme Court of Victoria’s opinion suggests that the policy
arguments against the court asserting jurisdiction over Dow Jones are driven by
the belief of the superiority of US law and not grounded in business interest.
Joseph Gutnick v. Dow Jones & Company, (2001) VSC 305, ¶61 (Austl.). This
suggests a belief that the consequences of the decision will not derail the
business objectives of the company or cause them to limit publication.
350
This is one area of international defamation law that might benefit from
an international agreement. If damages are limited to injury incurred in the
jurisdiction in which the action is being pursued, media companies risk the
punitive penalties that plaintiff-friendly libel countries could confer.
351
Wahlquist, supra note 291.
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CONCLUSION
The conflicts surrounding US law and foreign libel laws
concern a number of different issues and could have an enormous
impact on the practices of the media in the emerging global
market. Since part of the conflict arises from differences in
underlying substantive law values, the issue in an international
context cannot be easily dealt with through long-arm jurisdiction
or principles of comity. It is impossible to say that one law is
superior to another, and unrealistic to assume that one should
control the other in practice. Freedom of expression is protected in
both the UK and the US, and maybe this should be the starting
point towards more harmonization in the law. Instead of trying to
change the law directly, those brought to suit could try to change it
slowly within the confines of the developing qualified privilege
doctrine. Defendants like Conde Nast might not be protected, but
authors like Deborah Irving and Rachel Ehrenfeld might have
more of a chance at success.

